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INTRODUCTION 
Andreas Gofas
Associate Professor of International Relations, 
Panteion University of Athens; director of the Center 
for the Analysis of Terrorism and European Security 
(CATES) at the European Law and Governance 
School; and co-director, Olympia Summer Academy.
Terrorism, and our response to it, is among the 
most compelling European security issues. To 
expand on a point made by Richard English, we 
face four kinds of terrorist problem. The first 
is practical and the second analytical, and our 
difficulties in responding to the practical problem 
have been significantly exacerbated by our failings 
with regard to the analytical.1 The third kind of 
terrorist problem is informational and the fourth 
perceptual. For many years, data-driven analysis 
and information regarding the terrorist risk Europe 
is facing have failed to reach opinion-makers and 
mainstream audiences. At the same time, the 
considerable counter-terrorism efforts made by 
both the EU and NATO have gone somewhat 
unnoticed by the European public. Indeed, 
according to a 2016 Special Eurobarometer survey, 
69% of European citizens consider EU action in 
the fight against terrorism to be “insufficient.”2 
In effect, the threat of terrorism remains a source 
of much public anxiety, with 40% of European 
citizens perceiving the risk of a terrorist attack to 
be high.3
1 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. ix.
2 Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, Europeans in 
2016: Perceptions and expectations, fight against terrorism and 
radicalization, Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, 
European Parliamentary Research Service, European Commission, 
2016, p. 8 (available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/
eurobarometre/2016/attentes/eb85_1_synthesis_perceptions_
wishes_terrorism_en.pdf) .
3 Ibid, p. 10.
In order to discuss these hugely important 
problems and all too pressing security governance 
challenges, in June 2017 the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies organised a 
workshop on ‘Terrorism and European Security 
Governance.’ In line with the Centre’s mission 
to promote dialogue with the world of practice, 
the workshop brought together well-known 
academics in the field and officials from NATO, 
Europol and the European Commission. This 
edited volume groups together some of the 
presentations delivered at the workshop to make 
a minor, yet hopefully timely, contribution to the 
analytical and governance challenges that we face 
and also to the framing of the wider debate on the 
security situation in Europe.
I am particularly thankful to the volume’s authors 
for their insightful contributions, to NATO’s 
Public Diplomacy Division for co-sponsoring the 
event that led to this work, to the Director of the 
Robert Schuman Centre, Professor Brigid Laffan, 
for fully supporting the project from its inception, 
and to Professor Diego Gambetta and Professor 
Olivier Roy for acting as workshop panel chairs 










Professor of Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, 
where he is also Distinguished Professorial Fellow 
in the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global 
Peace, Security and Justice.
Four main points are vital when we attempt to 
understand twenty-first-century terrorism. 
First, let us not forget what we already know that 
we know about terrorism; let us not overlook 
the knowledge that has been derived from close 
scrutiny of its long past. The most important 
areas of analysis regarding terrorism (definition, 
causation, consequences, best response) are all 
ones on which there exists a vast amount of hard-
learned understanding. This does not always seem 
to be the case when one listens to some politicians, 
as they (for example) promise to eradicate from 
the face of the earth a form of terrorism that 
is almost certain to outlive their own political 
careers. In reality, we know that terrorism will 
be something with which we have to learn to live 
rather than something which can be extirpated; 
and we know that the forms of terrorism about 
which we are most concerned (those practised by 
the major enduring terrorist organizations) are 
themselves likely to persist for a lengthy period 
before disappearing. A vast literature attests to 
these findings.1 
1 See, for example, R. Singh, Hamas and Suicide Terrorism: 
Multi-Causal and Multi-Level Approaches (London: Routledge, 
2011); R. English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA 
(London: Pan Macmillan, 2012 edn.); R. English, Terrorism: How 
to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); M. Crenshaw 
and G. LaFree, Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 
We also know that we know that intelligence-led 
policing in most cases offers a more powerful 
resource for countering terrorism than does 
a more militarily-focused response (although 
the two need not be mutually exclusive); that 
mistreating suspects will probably do the state’s 
adversaries more good than it will benefit the 
state itself; and that credibility in counter-terrorist 
public argument is vital.2
So we need to agree on what we have cumulatively 
learned. This is as true of the scholarly community 
as it is of politicians. And it means that we have 
to recognize how new (or not new) some recently 
published arguments actually are. Marc Sageman 
has done much valuable work analysing terrorism,3 
but his 2017 book, Misunderstanding Terrorism, 
presents a supposedly new ‘Model of the Turn to 
Political Violence’ which is in fact already very 
deeply familiar from the existing literature on 
past terrorist campaigns. Scholars who know the 
histories of even older terrorist groups such as 
ETA, Hamas, the Provisional IRA or the Baader-
Meinhof group are fully aware of the supposedly 
new model that Sagemen sets out of actors turning 
to terrorism: “escalation of hostility between 
the state and their community, which includes 
a cumulative radicalization of discourse; their 
disillusionment with non-violent legal tactics; and 
moral outrage at new state aggression against their 
community.”4
Brookings Institution, 2017); A. K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: 
Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); L. Richardson, What 
Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John 
Murray, 2006).
2 For expansion on these points, see R. English, Terrorism: 
How to Respond. See also S. O’Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t Work: 
The Neuroscience of Interrogation (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2015).
3 M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); M. 
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First 
Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
4 M. Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), pp. 111, 130; cf. R. English, 
Does Terrorism Work? A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY - Richard English4
To forget or to ignore what we know that we know 
will hamper our forward movement as a scholarly 
community of understanding. A similar amnesia 
in policy circles is potentially as damaging, and 
has been evident in the practice of some major 
counter-terrorist organizations.5
The second point to stress is this: we need to resolve 
as far as we can the problem of the geography of 
understanding terrorism. It is a common reality 
that the geographical settings within which 
scholarly research is conducted can generate 
contextual biases, preferences and cultures of 
interpretation.6 Such a pattern is also evident in 
the academic study of terrorism, in the sense that 
most terrorism research is carried out in settings 
in which there is very little terrorism, while those 
settings generating most terrorism produce 
comparatively little influential research on the 
subject. So, for example, a third of all terrorist 
attacks recorded in the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) occurred in just five countries: Colombia, 
India, Iraq, Pakistan and Peru; in 2012, over half 
of all worldwide terrorist attacks occurred in just 
three countries: Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.7 
But if we consider the locations of the contributors 
to a leading journal in the field, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, we find that for the period 2000-
14, 46% of the articles originated from US-based 
scholars, 71.5% originated from the USA, the UK 
and Israel, and a mere 1% involved people based in 
any of the five countries which account for a third 
of all GTD terrorist attacks (Colombia, India, Iraq, 
Pakistan and Peru).8
Now there are clear reasons for this, including the 
Press, 2016); S. Aust, Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 edn.).
5 C. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized 
History of MI5 (London: Penguin, 2009).
6  D. N. Livingstone, Putting Science in its Place: Geographies 
of Scientific Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003).
7 G. LaFree, L. Dugan, and E. Miller, Putting Terrorism 
in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database (London: 
Routledge, 2015), p. 53. 
8 R. English, ‘The Future Study of Terrorism,’ European 
Journal of International Security (1, 2, July 2016).
geographically-weighted infrastructure of major 
universities, the dominance of English-language 
research, and the cultural and political barriers to 
the generation of academic work in some settings. 
I am not in any way seeking to criticize journal 
editors, and I do not underestimate the obstacles to 
remedying this problem. Nor am I suggesting that 
only those scholars with long-term proximity to 
terrorism will produce the best research. However, 
it does seem to me that there are some potential 
and distinctive insights to be gleaned from such 
long-term context-based immersion, and that 
the existing imbalance between long-distance 
work and field-based work perhaps occludes 
our vision of this phenomenon (especially since 
most terrorism remains local).9 Long-term field-
based expertise is also vital in terms of policy-
based understanding of terrorism and counter-
terrorism; and again there are occasions when 
such expertise seems not to be as fully appreciated 
as might be ideal.10 
Third, understanding terrorism in the twenty-
first century means looking simultaneously at 
terrorism, counter-terrorism and the mutually 
shaping relationship between them. There exists a 
paradoxically intimate relationship between state 
actors and their non-state terrorist adversaries, 
and the actions of each side help to determine 
the behaviour of their opponent. This has long 
been the case, whether in Israel/Palestine, Spain, 
Ireland, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, western 
Europe during the late-twentieth-century era of 
left-wing violence, or more recently in the post-
9/11 era. So the journey from al-Qaida to ISIS, 
for example, is one which can only be understood 
if we identify the effects of post-11 September 
counter-terrorism policy on the regional politics 
which helped to generate Islamic State.11  
On both sides of this antiphonal asymmetrical 
9 A. B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the 
Roots of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
10 J. Nixon, Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of 
Saddam Hussein (London: Bantam Press, 2016).
11 F. A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016).
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relationship between terrorists and counter-
terrorists there tends to be an exaggeration of 
what violence can achieve; and also on both sides 
there tends to be a comforting sense that prior 
violence by the other side legitimates brutality by 
one’s own. How far this seems true will vary from 
case to case and from observer to observer. But the 
central reality remains: whether as an academic or 
as a policy actor, one cannot properly understand 
and respond to non-state terrorism without 
synoptically examining terrorism, counter-
terrorism, and their complex protean relationship 
with one another.12
Fourth, a fuller understanding of terrorism in 
the twenty-first century will emerge, I believe, 
if historians and an appreciation of history play 
an increasingly major part in our thinking. The 
blinding power of terrorist atrocity often involves 
an impulse towards the solipsism of the present. 
So post-9/11 considerations probably over-
focused on al-Qaida, just as (at time of writing) an 
obsession with ISIS perhaps hinders longer-term 
understanding and reflection. 
I am not suggesting that only historians can 
understand and explain terrorism. Every academic 
discipline has the potential to offer profound and 
unique insights, and what we require is multi-
disciplinary analysis. But it is true that historians 
as a tribe have been less keen to colonize the 
territory of terrorism than have, say, political 
scientists, international relations scholars or 
economists. It is also true that there are distinctive 
aspects of historians’ methodology which might 
yield particular benefit as we reflect on this long-
rooted phenomenon.
A number of elements in the historian’s typical 
approach might be judged especially valuable. 
Historians assess change and continuity over 
lengthy pasts, and this might serve as a corrective 
to easy over-presentist assessments of terrorist 
12  For wider discussion of these points, see R. English 
(ed.), Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
threats, dangers and possibilities. Historians also 
tend to focus on the complex particularity, and 
even the uniqueness, of each setting; this can 
help to avoid over-simplistic generalizations, an 
ever-present difficulty when facing terrorism. 
The historian’s commitment to engagement with 
large numbers of mutually interrogating sources, 
including first-hand sources, helps to ensure a 
clear-eyed view of what terrorists actually intend 
and accomplish. The historians’ instinctive 
scepticism about over-Procrustean abstract theory 
counters some tendencies in a theoretically model-
dominated field. And the majority preference 
among historians for the contingent rather than 
the inevitable during processes of human change 
again counsels us against crudely determined 
analyses.13
As noted, none of this undermines the enormous 
and equal value of other disciplinary approaches. 
But there are intellectual as well as practical policy-
relevant dimensions to a historically attuned 
approach to twenty-first-century terrorism. Not 
least among these will be a humility about what 
can actually be achieved. When one considers 
the historical complexity and the very long roots 
of terrorism-generating conflicts (from Israel/
Palestine to Syria, to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to 
Ireland, to Colombia and beyond), one is struck 
by how Sisyphean a task counter-terrorism can 
seem. If such an attitude seems depressing, then 
the dangers of ignoring such a scale of challenge 
are probably more appalling.
13  For an expansion on the ways in which historical method 
can aid the study of terrorism, see R. English, Does Terrorism Work?







Professor of International Studies and Global 
History, Leiden University
What is the link between the Peruvian Shining 
Path, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda? The answer is that 
despite the very different locations, backgrounds 
and approaches of these groups, all feature 
on international lists of designated terrorist 
organisations.1 This contribution will argue that 
grouping these divergent violent actors together 
under the rubric of terrorism is a problem. It is 
problematic not only because it muddles the 
definition and conceptualisation of terrorism 
unnecessarily through the inclusion of a panoply 
of different organisations with different strategic 
approaches but, importantly, the practice is also 
problematic because the diverging strategies the 
groups employ have important consequences and 
constraints on the counter-measures that states 
can enact. A conceptual distinction between 
terrorist and insurgent strategies is crucial. 
Political, organisational and relational distinctions 
separate these two distinct approaches. Making 
the distinction is important, first, in order to 
understand the widespread charge that there 
is too much of a Western focus in the terrorism 
debate to the detriment of non-Western 
experiences (see also the contribution by Richard 
1  For the US list, see https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/
des/123085.htm. For the EU list, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009E0468&qid=14125963
55797&from=EN. 
English in this volume). Second, the distinction 
has significant consequences when it comes to 
designing appropriate answers to counter these 
activities. This contribution will proceed by first 
outlining the differences between the two strategic 
approaches and subsequently thinking through 
the consequences for counterterrorism (CT). 
Terrorism versus Insurgency2 
In contemporary discourse, it appears that any 
non-state armed group using violence is terrorist. 
This simplification of reality obfuscates the 
fact that many of these non-state groups have 
a choice between several different approaches 
to challenge their opponents, which are usually 
states. Terrorism is but one of these methods. 
It can be distinguished from insurgency and 
conventional war, its two main alternatives, 
by its distinctive political, organisational and 
relational features. Politically, terrorism is an 
indirect approach; organisationally, it thrives on 
secrecy but possesses limited material and human 
capacity; and relationally, it is often distant from 
the population rather than operating in its midst. 
Insurgents are not simply terrorists with territory 
but have a distinct dynamic of their own. Their 
political strategy is geared towards putting direct 
pressure on the government or governments; 
this is combined with an active organisation 
of the population in an alternative governance 
relationship or a shadow state; and relationally, 
insurgents operate among the population on 
whose behalf they (claim to) fight. Conventional 
war is relatively rare among non-state groups 
since it requires large-scale material and fighting 
capacities that are usually the prerogative of states. 
The Tamil Tigers are one of the few groups that have 
managed to fight conventionally but this was part 
of a final phase of insurgency warfare. Politically, 
2  For a previous version of some of these arguments, see 
Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Mario Fumerton 2009. ‘Insurgency and 
Terrorism: Is there a difference?’ in: Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsater 
and Christopher Coker (eds.), The Character of War in the 21st 
Century London: Routledge, pp. 27-41. 
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conventional war entails a direct translation of 
military goals into political ends; organisationally, 
it requires direct large-scale consistent engagement 
with the population, possibly in the shape of a 
social contract; relationally, there are very close 
ties between the group and the population. Since 
conventional war is rare, the elaboration of these 
arguments below will focus on the distinction 
between terrorism and insurgency. 
Terrorism and insurgency both embrace a 
political goal. The road to achieve it, however, 
diverges. Contrary to some recent scholarship, 
this contribution will argue that terrorism is a 
strategic enterprise and not simply a tactic or 
a method. The reason is that there is a means-
ends relationship, which features prominently 
in almost all attempts to understand this social 
phenomenon. If we deny the political dimension 
and focus solely on terrorism as a tactic, part of the 
picture becomes unbalanced. To be fair, within the 
strategic approach of insurgency, terrorism does 
occur as a tactic. In that case it remains linked 
to the means-ends relationship that is central to 
insurgency as well. 
The essence of the strategic approach of terrorism 
is to provoke responses from the opponent that 
will bring the stated goals closer. A terrorist 
strategy in and of itself is rarely able to directly 
translate its violent activities into political effects 
commensurate with these stated goals. More often, 
terrorist actions create an effect that indirectly 
contributes to their political objective. Violence 
can be seen, in the perspective of the terrorist, as 
propaganda by deed, a concept that has roots in 
the nineteenth century. Alternatively, insurgency 
is a more direct strategic approach that links its 
political goals to a military operational plan. 
Conceptualised originally by Mao, and amended 
and ameliorated by subsequent generations of 
thinkers and practitioners of revolutionary war, 
insurgency is focused on a political objective 
which can be reached directly by offering an 
alternative political model: alternative governance 
for a population in a specific territory.3 
3  Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. 2012. The 
Organisational differences take shape via the 
routes of recruitment and the structures of groups. 
Terrorists rely on secrecy, recruit on a small 
scale and are highly selective in this recruitment 
process. The survival of the group depends on 
the maintenance of secrecy and a guarded life in 
the underground, and less than careful selection 
runs the risk of detection and group demise. The 
small-scale organisational structure that these 
groups embrace falls short in cases where they 
manage to attract significant popular support. If 
the group fails to accommodate this support, it is 
bound to decline. This is where insurgents hold 
stronger cards. Their organisational structure is 
able to welcome recruits, in fact it actively seeks 
to welcome them. These individuals will build 
the support base on which the core structure 
of the group relies. The process of recruitment 
is less selective and therefore leads to a risk of 
denunciation of the insurgent group. 
The social relations between the group and the 
wider population form a last distinctive feature of 
the two strategic approaches. For collective political 
violence to be effective and successful, popular 
support and legitimacy are necessary. Active or 
passive support for terrorist organisations is often 
more an ‘aspiration by way of inspiration’ than a 
clear tactical or operational goal.4 For insurgents, 
without popular support they cannot exist. Human 
and material capabilities are necessary for the 
group to function and only the population, whose 
support they must foremost seek, can provide this. 
These distinctive features have consequences for 
the counter-measures that can be employed. What 
works against a group that uses violence as a call to 
arms, is secretive and is small-scale is fundamentally 
different from what works against a group that 
aspires to gain control over a population by way 
of offering governance and a social contract. Both 
terrorist and insurgent strategies are characterised 
by extreme flexibility and adaptability. Non-state 
Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. London: 
Taylor & Francis.
4  Duyvesteyn and Mario Fumerton, ‘Insurgency and 
Terrorism: Is there a difference?’ p. 38. 
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actor groups can shift between the strategies of 
terrorism and insurgency and have been known to 
do so in many instances. Over the course of their 
existence, the groups mentioned at the start of 
this contribution have embraced both insurgency 
and terrorism. The Shining Path in Peru put a 
Maoist insurgency strategy into practice that 
involved territorial control and alternative forms 
of governance. Since the apprehension of their 
leader, Abimael Guzman, in the early 1990s, the 
group has switched to a more terrorist approach. 
Hezbollah has interestingly moved from being a 
terrorist group, to an insurgency strategy focused 
on safeguarding the rights of the Shi’ite population 
in Lebanon, to becoming a full participant in the 
official politics of the Lebanese state. Al Qaeda 
and its many incarnations since its inception in 
the 1980s used the territory of the Afghan state 
to launch its worldwide struggle, employed a 
terrorist strategy, but according to many experts 




The flexibility and adaptability of these violent 
non-state actors to shift between approaches lead 
to increased complexity for states attempting to 
counter them. These transformations are given 
shape prominently in a substitution or ‘waterbed’ 
effect. There are four forms of substitution:  tactics, 
targets, territory and time – the T4 of substitution. 
5 Terrorists shift between tactics; when one tactic 
becomes more difficult, they shift to other more 
easily executable tactics.6 For example, airplane 
hijacking in the early 1970s was extremely popular 
5 Bruno S. Frey, 2004. Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or 
Carrot? London: Edward Elgar. 
6 Walter Enders and Todd Sanders, 2000. “Is 
Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?; A 
Time-Series Investigation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
44 (3): 307-332. Walter Enders, 2004. “What do we Know 
about the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?” 
In Andrew Silke (ed.) Research on Terrorism: Trends, 
Achievements & Failures, London: Frank Cass, pp. 119-137.
among terrorist groups. These hijackings were not 
intended to kill people but to attract attention 
and were highly effective. With the institution 
of safety measures such as metal detectors and 
luggage checks at airports, the practice almost 
disappeared but conventional bombings rose 
sharply. Furthermore, there is also evidence that 
non-state armed groups copy successful tactics 
from others. One example is the spread of suicide 
terrorism. 
Similar to shifts in tactics, targeting is subject 
to frequent change. When targets become less 
accessible, a shift to others is commonly observable. 
An example here are the embassy fortifications 
that became standard practice after the embassy 
bombings in East Africa in 1998. The bombing 
of these diplomatic representations dwindled but 
targeting alternative American targets increased. 
Substitution in the shape of territory is visible 
in spillover effects or conscious choices to carry 
out attacks in previously untouched areas. One 
example is Hezbollah, which has purportedly 
carried out attacks in Europe and South America 
in its struggle against Israel. 
The last substitution effect is postponement in 
time. This is very difficult to prove. When did an 
organisation decide to wait until a later moment 
or more conducive period of time for its attacks? 
Still, it forms part of the range of options available 
to terrorist and insurgent groups. 
The four forms of substitution and their examples 
point to the close links between substitution and 
counter-measures. A very strong cause and effect 
relationship is visible. Counter-measures affect 
choices of tactics, targets, territory and time and 
therefore form a prominent witness to their effect. 
This also shows that the resolution of one problem 
tends to create another. What are the consequences 
that deserve further attention?  
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Consequences for CT  
These short reflections lead to several pressing 
issues. Counter-measures cause shifts in strategic 
approaches and substitution. What can work 
against groups working with a terrorist approach, 
however, is not the same as what can be effective 
against insurgents. On the basis of previous 
experiences, to counter-balance the attractiveness 
of insurgent claims the provision of a working 
social contract can be effective. The flip side of this 
argument has recently been observed in the areas 
under the control of Islamic State for example.7 
The alternative offer of a credible social contract in 
the absence of alternatives contributed to its hold 
over populations and territory. A Syrian and Iraqi 
state alternative was absent. However, countering 
terrorist groups by way of a viable counter-measure 
does not make much sense. A related issue here 
is whether the distinction between terrorism and 
insurgency does not in fact denote a distinction 
between the Western and non-Western world. It 
is a fact that territory cannot easily be contested 
against a well-functioning Westphalian state and 
it would require significant capability. Does this 
make insurgency exclusively a problem of the 
developing world and does it rule out strategic 
terrorism? Some more scholarly attention 
investigating this would be welcome. 
Second, if terrorism is a problem of the Western 
world with little or no chance of rival territorial 
control, except possibly for foreign sanctuary, how 
can we think of counter- measures? Where do the 
weaknesses lie in the approach of terrorism? The 
organisational structure can be targeted and the 
violent activities curbed, but again such groups 
are highly adaptable. The political challenge that 
terrorism poses is where exploitable weaknesses 
potentially reside.  
7 Craig Whiteside, 2016. ‘The Islamic State and the Return 
of Revolutionary Warfare.’ Small Wars and Insurgencies 27 (5), pp. 
743-776.
When counter-terrorism measures feed 
substitution behaviour, the valid question is that 
of the extent to which we have shifted the problem 
rather than resolved it. Different tactics, other 
targets or a shift in territory have morphed the 
challenge posed by these violent groups. What 
then is our definition of success? Is a shift a form 
of success? These questions require some sort of 
answer if we are to break the cycle of measure and 
counter-measure repeating itself over and over 
again. 
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Introduction
Throughout Europe, there is a merging of criminal 
and extremist milieus. German Federal Police 
state that of the 778 German foreign fighters 
about whom they have sufficient information, 
two-thirds had police records prior to travelling 
to Syria.1 The Belgian Federal Prosecutor says 
that approximately half of the country’s jihadists 
had criminal records prior to leaving for Syria.2 A 
United Nations report suggests a similar pattern 
amongst French foreign fighters.3 Officials from 
Norway and the Netherlands told us that “at 
least 60 per cent” of their countries’ jihadists had 
previously been involved in crime.4 It is for this 
reason that Alain Grignard, the head of Brussels 
Federal Police, described Islamic State as “a sort of 
super-gang.”5
1 BKA, BfV & HKE (2016), ‘Analyse der 
Radikalisierungshintergründe und -verläufe der Personen, die aus 
islamistischer Motivation aus Deutschland in Richtung Syrien oder 
Irak ausgereist sind – Fortschreibung 2016’,  p.18.
2 Christophe Lamfalussy (2015), ‘Un djihadiste belge sur 
deux a un passé de délinquant,’ La Libre, 14 August.
3 United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team (2015), ‘Analysis and recommendations with 
regard to the global threat from foreign terrorist fighters’, p.11.
4 Interviews with Dutch and Norwegian police officers 
(2016), 1-2 September.
5 Paul Cruickshank (2015), ‘A view from the CT foxhole: 
an interview with Alain Grignard, Brussels Federal Police’, CTC 
Sentinel, 21 August.
This article describes the dynamics of this crime-
terror nexus in order to understand what it 
means for the terrorist threat and how to counter 
it. The article addresses four questions. How 
does criminality facilitate radicalisation and 
recruitment? What is the role of prisons? Do 
criminals possess skills that make them more 
effective as terrorists? And how do criminals 
finance their terrorist activities?
To analyse these issues, a multi-lingual team of 
ICSR researchers compiled a database containing 
the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with 
criminal pasts. As far as we know, it is the first 
database of its kind. While it is not a representative 
survey of European ‘gangster’ jihadists, it has 
provided source material for a better understanding 
of the different dynamics and developments. By 
analysing the pathways, motivations and actions 
of these jihadists, we have been able to ascertain 
some characteristics that define the crime-terror 
nexus in the context of the current jihadist threat.
In the following sections, we will examine two 
themes for which we have found evidence in our 
database: (1) radicalisation, including the prison 
environment; and (2) ‘skill transfers,’ including 
criminal financing.
What we observe in the case of jihadist recruits 
in Europe is not a convergence of criminals and 
terrorists as organisations but of their social 
networks, environments or milieus. In other 
words: rather than being one or the other, criminal 
and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the 
same pool of people, creating (often unintended) 
synergies and overlaps that have consequences in 
terms of how individuals radicalise and operate. 
This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. 
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Radicalisation and 
Recruitment
With criminal pasts being prominent among 
both foreign fighters and the perpetrators of 
the recent ‘wave’ of terrorist attacks, one of the 
most compelling questions is how criminal 
pasts contribute to processes of radicalisation.6 
The profiles and pathways that emerge from our 
database suggest that the jihadist narrative is 
surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs 
and desires of criminals: it can offer ‘redemption’ 
while also licensing criminality. These processes 
can take place within prisons, which are likely to 
become important centres of gravity for jihadism 
in the coming years.
The Redemption Narrative
Recurrent among criminals in our database 
was what we term the ‘redemption narrative.’ 
These were criminals who had experienced what 
Quintan Wiktorowicz calls a “cognitive opening,” 
a shocking event or personal crisis that prompted 
them to re-assess their lives and become open to 
a radical change of values and behaviour.7 They 
realised a need to break with their criminal past 
and make up for their ‘sins.’ This then provided 
the rationale for their turn to religion and justified 
their involvement with jihadist groups.
That they sought redemption in jihadism instead 
of other more mainstream forms of religion 
or spirituality may be explained by a strong 
alignment of needs and narratives. In other words, 
involvement in jihadism offered redemption from 
6 In this context, radicalisation refers to the personal 
circumstances, experiences, narratives, networks and other factors 
that explain an individual’s involvement in extremism and their 
mobilisation to engage in violence. For more, see Peter R. Neumann 
(2013), ‘The Trouble with Radicalization,’ International Affairs, Vol 
89, No 4, pp. 873-93.
7 Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005), Radical Islam Rising: 
Muslim Extremism in the West (London: Rowman & Littlefield), 
p.20.
crime while satisfying the same personal needs and 
desires that had led them to become involved in it. 
Just like the criminal gangs of which they used to 
be members, jihadist groups offer experiences of 
power, violence and adventure, and provide their 
members with a strong identity and a sense of 
rebellion and being anti-establishment. This made 
the ‘jump’ from criminality to terrorism smaller 
than is commonly perceived – especially when 
considering that, unlike al-Qaeda, Islamic State 
requires practically no religious knowledge or 
learning, and – at least in the recruitment phase 
– cares less about the complexities of theological 
discourse. For a criminal with a guilty conscience, 
the jihadism of Islamic State could seem like a 
perfect fit.
Among the most prominent examples is 
Abderrozak ‘Big A’ Benarabe, a long-time criminal 
from Copenhagen who turned to jihadism after 
his brother was diagnosed with cancer. When 
explaining why he became a foreign fighter, he 
immediately referred to his criminal past: “… 
some people have died at my hands. This is a 
big problem when I meet Allah … It’s not good 
enough just to pray with all the shit I’ve done.”8
Legitimising Crime
While the jihadist narrative can be a source 
of redemption, it may also serve to legitimate 
crime. This is nothing new. Anwar al-Awlaki, 
the influential radical cleric, repeatedly told his 
followers that “stealing from your enemies” in 
the dar al-harb (lands of war) is permitted, and in 
certain cases obligatory.9 This has the potential to 
be enormously effective because it offers criminals 
an opportunity for ‘redemption’ without requiring 
any change of behaviour. Islamic State shares this 
doctrine, stating in its Rumiyah magazine that 
8 Nagieb Khaja (2014), ‘On the frontline in Syria: The 
Danish gangster who turned jihadi,’ The Guardian, 7 July.
9 Al-Awlaki cited in Thomas Joscelyn (2011), ‘Anwar al 
Awlaki: Jihadists should steal from disbelievers,’ Long War Journal, 
17 January.
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“the kafir’s wealth is halal for you, so take it.”10 
Far from considering such offenses a sin, some 
jihadists actively encourage crime.
The most prominent example is the network 
around Khalid Zerkani. Born in Morocco in 1973, 
Zerkani moved to Belgium as an adult. Whilst 
he had engaged in petty crime and shoplifting, 
his greatest talent was as an Islamic State 
recruiter. He encouraged young men, mostly with 
Moroccan backgrounds, to commit petty crimes 
and robberies in Brussels.11 This was justified on 
religious grounds: as a witness in his trial testified, 
Zerkani reassured recruits that “to steal from the 
infidels is permitted by Allah.”12
Prior to his 2014 arrest, Zerkani had become a 
hugely influential figure in the Brussels jihadist 
scene, responsible for the mobilisation of up to 72 
foreign fighters.13 His most infamous protégé was 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a key coordinator of the 
network that carried out the mass-casualty attacks 
in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in March 
2016. More than any other example, the way he 
operated illustrates the idea behind the new crime-
terror nexus, because it produced a near-perfect 
merging of the two milieus. 
Prisons
One place where these milieus naturally meet 
is prison. Prisons have been in the spotlight for 
nearly a decade as places where radicalisation 
10 Islamic State (2017), Rumiyah issue 9, p.12. See also 
Rumiyah issue 11 for more encouragement of criminal behaviour.
11 Patrick J. McDonnell (2016), ‘“Papa Noel” – the militant 
recruiter in Brussels who groomed young men for violence,’ Los 
Angeles Times, 28 March.
12 Andrew Higgins and Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura (2016), 
‘A Brussels Mentor Who Taught “Gangster Islam” to the Young and 
Angry,’ New York Times, 11 April.
13 Pieter Van Ostaeyen and Guy Van Vlierden (2016), 
‘Belgian Fighters in Syria and Iraq – An Important Review of 
Our Data’ 3 August, available at: https://pietervanostaeyen.
com/2016/08/03/belgian-f ighters-in-syria-and-iraq-an-
important-review-of-our-data/ (last accessed 22 July 2017).
occurs.14 57 percent (45 out of 79 profiles) of our 
sample spent time incarcerated prior to their 
mobilisation, with sentences ranging from one 
month to over ten years. More significantly, at least 
31 percent of those who spent time in prison (14 
out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although – in 
most cases – the process continued and intensified 
after their release.
This is because prisons are places of vulnerability. 
For many new inmates, the very fact of 
imprisonment is a personal crisis which raises 
profound questions about their lives while 
offering ample time to search for meaning. While 
cut off from their immediate family, friends and 
wider society, inmates find themselves in an 
environment which is often hostile, unfamiliar 
and tribal in nature, with divisions along religious 
or ethnic lines. New inmates are mentally and 
physically vulnerable, and may experience 
‘cognitive openings’ – a willingness and desire to 
identify with new ideas, beliefs and social groups.15
For the same reason, jihadist recruiters view 
prisons as places of opportunity. Not only are 
inmates vulnerable and they experience cognitive 
openings, thereby making them receptive to 
jihadist ideas, but they also tend to be part of 
the demographic that jihadist groups are keen to 
attract: young men from Muslim backgrounds (but 
rarely practicing) who are impulsive and willing 
to take risks, and have already been in conflict 
with established authorities.16 Far from being an 
obstacle, their criminal pasts have desensitised 
them to law-breaking and violence, and may, in 
fact, have provided them with useful skills for a 
terrorist career. From the jihadists’ perspective, 
prisons are the perfect ‘breeding ground.’
14 See Peter R. Neumann (2010), ‘Prisons and Terrorism: 
Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries,’ The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR).
15 Ibid., p.26.
16 See Andrew Silke (2008), ‘Holy Warriors: exploring the 
psychological processes of jihadi radicalization,’ European Journal 
of Criminology, Vol 5, No 1, p. 107.
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Even those outside of prison can exploit this, as 
shown by the prison outreach of Shiraz Tariq, 
leader of the Danish Salafist group Kaldet til Islam 
(Call to Islam).17 He wrote letters to imprisoned 
members of gangs in Copenhagen, appealing to 
their guilty consciences. The group’s Facebook 
page stated that Muslims in prisons “[are] getting 
off track, so we thought we could write letters to 
[them] and remind them of Allah. They have plenty 
of time to read.”18 While it remains unknown how 
effective this was – the group also saw non-prison 
recruits travel to Syria – it is an example of an 
attempt to recruit criminals.
Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests 
and convictions, and the rapidly expanding 
number of convicted terrorists in custody, prisons 
are likely to become more significant as centres of 
gravity for the jihadist movement.
Skill Transfers
One of the most disturbing aspects of the new 
crime-terror nexus is the potential for criminal 
‘skills’ to be transferred to terrorists. Our database 
illustrates four factors: first, that individuals with a 
criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; 
second, that many are adept at staying ‘under the 
radar’ and are familiar with evading the authorities; 
third, that their experience and familiarity with 
violence lowers their (psychological) threshold 
for involvement in terrorist acts; and fourth, that 
crime is often used to fund terrorism.
Weapons
As early as 2013, the Danish intelligence service 
warned that the strong presence of criminals 
amongst Danish jihadists would lead to a 
17 Tariq himself did not have a criminal record, although 
many in Kaldet til Islam did; they were included in the research 
sample.
18 Simon Bedtsen, Mette Dahlgaard and Kasper Krogh 
(2013), ‘Fængslede muslimer skal have brev fra ekstreme islamister’, 
Berlingske, 2 October.
proliferation of firearms among them.19 Two 
years later, the warning came true when Omar 
el-Hussein carried out two shootings in February 
2015. Between the two attacks, he went to his 
neighbourhood of Mjølnerparken and gave 
the M95 rifle that he had used during the first 
shooting to a former fellow gang member for him 
to dispose of it.20 This rifle was itself stolen during 
a robbery in 2013.21 He also met with former 
gang associates, one of whom was in possession 
of the same ammunition that el-Hussein used in 
the second attack, making it plausible that he had 
supplied him with new ammunition. In short, his 
gang connections eased his access to weapons.
Islamic State itself has acknowledged the value 
of their operatives appearing like “ordinary” 
criminals. In the July 2015 issue of Dar al-Islam, 
their French language magazine, the group advised 
operatives to conceal all external displays of 
religiosity when acquiring weapons, and instead, 
adopt the look of a “jeune de cité” (a youth from 
the town) who is “looking to make a robbery with 
a weapon.”22 This advice proved to be unnecessary, 
as many of their supporters genuinely fit this 
profile.
Staying ‘Under the Radar’
In addition to procuring firearms, access to 
criminal networks makes it easier for terrorists to 
‘stay under the radar’. This includes, for example, 
the use of fake documents and access to safe houses 
which enable terrorists to evade the authorities, 
and therefore increases the likelihood of a plot 
turning into a successful attack.
19 PET Center for Terroranalyse (2015), ‘Truslen mod 
Danmark fra personer udrejst til Syrien’, 23 October, p.3.
20 Niels Vedersø Østergaard (2016), ‘Terrortiltalt hjalp 
Omar El-Hussein,’ Berlingske, 17 March.
21 Michala Rask Mikkelsen (2015), ‘Riffel fra terrorangreb 
blev stjålet under hjemmerøveri’, Berlingske, 18 February. The rifle 
model is otherwise known as an RK 95 TP.
22 Al-Hayat (2015), ‘Dar al-Islam Numéro 5,’ p.33.
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The Paris and Brussels network that carried out 
attacks in November 2015 and March 2016 did 
exactly this. Their use of fraudulent identities 
allowed the network to wire money, travel between 
countries, rent cars and – crucially – acquire safe 
houses.23 For example, Khalid el-Bakraoui used 
forged identification papers – adopting the name 
‘Ibrahim Maaroufi’ – to rent an apartment in 
Charleroi which was subsequently used by at least 
two of the Paris attackers.24 Another apartment 
in Schaerbeek – rented under the pseudonym 
Fernando Castillo – was used as a bomb factory 
to manufacture the TATP explosives and suicide 
vests used in the Paris attacks.25 
Rather than becoming forgers themselves, the 
terrorists who launched the attacks in Paris 
and Brussels used their contacts in the criminal 
milieu to reach out to forgers who serviced people 
traffickers. This is how they came across Djamal 
Eddine Ouali, an Algerian who ran a forgery 
operation in Brussels. The supposed ‘profit vs. 
ideology’ dichotomy, which is debated in the 
academic literature,26 was no barrier in this case. 
There is no evidence that Ouali knew of their 
true intentions, or was even interested in them. 
Instead, they probably appeared as ‘ordinary’ 
customers from a criminal milieu. As the Belgian 
investigator in charge of Ouali’s case said, “[He] 
was a professional document falsifier whose main 
goal was to make as much money as possible from 
his business.”27
23 Lori Hinnant (2015), ‘Piecing together Salah 
Abdeslam’s itinerary in Paris attacks: Days on end at 
the wheel and months of planning’, Associated Press, 10 
December.
24 The New York Times staff (2016), ‘Ibrahim and Khalid 
el-Bakraoui: From Bank Robbers to Brussels Bombers,’ The New 
York Times, 24 March.
25 Michael Wolgelenter (2016), ‘ISIS Militant 
Returned to Belgium Before Paris Attacks, ’ New York Times, 
13 January.
26 Santiago Ballina (2011), ‘The-Crime Terror Continuum 
Revisited,” Journal for Policing, Intelligence and the Power of 
Informal Networks’, Vol 6, No 2, 2011, pp.121-124.
27 Maïa de la Baume and Giulia Paravicini (2016), ‘Inside 
Familiarity with Violence
These practical and logistical skills are 
supplemented by a more intangible ‘skill’: that 
of familiarity with violence. 65 percent of the 
individuals in our database had been involved in 
violent crime. Among the 30 individuals who were 
involved in plots, this figure rose to 80 per cent. 
Routine engagement in violence as a criminal may 
lower the (psychological) threshold for becoming 
involved in violence as a terrorist. Our database 
shows that the period of mobilisation among the 
30 individuals involved in domestic plotting was 
often extraordinarily short, often less than four 
months or even just a few weeks. These findings 
support the idea that previous criminality 
produces more volatile terrorists.
The case of Mohammed Merah – who killed 7 
people, including three Jewish children, near his 
hometown of Toulouse in March 2012 – illustrates 
the often extreme histories of violence found. 
His attacks were the culmination of a life story 
characterised by routine violence, involving two 
stays in prison and 18 convictions for assaults, 
robberies, and thefts.28 As a teenager, Merah was 
reported at least 15 times for acts of violence, 
and was described as having “a violent profile 
from childhood and behavioural troubles.”29 This 
would continue into adulthood: in 2006 after his 
uncle asked him to stop making a noise with his 
quad bike, Merah beat him in the face with a fire 
extinguisher.30 In 2010 he blinded a teenage girl 
during an assault.31 By the time Merah travelled 
for terrorist training in Waziristan in 2011, no one 
the Brussels flat where terrorists scored fake IDs,’ Politico, 31 March.
28 Alex Jordanov (2015), ‘Mohamed Merah, de cas social 
à idole du jihad’, Les Inrocks, 17 June; and Virginie Andre and 
Shandon Harris-Hogan (2013), ‘Mohamed Merah: from petty 
criminal to neojihadist’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol 14, Issue 
2, pp.307-319.
29 BBC (2012), ‘Obituary: Toulouse gunman Mohamed 
Merah’, BBC News, 22 March.
30 Alex Jordanov (2015).
31 John Rosenthal (2016), ‘Merah: The ‘Untold Story’ of a 
French Jihadist Icon’, World Affairs, Winter.
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needed to ‘persuade’ him that the use of violence 
could be justified.
Financing
It is no surprise that criminal pasts also enable 
terrorist financing. Solid empirical examinations 
of this phenomenon are surprisingly rare, although 
two recent studies have started cataloguing the 
funding of jihadist activities in Europe. A report 
by Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp 
focuses on how European foreign fighters funded 
their travels to Syria. In addition to loans, private 
donations, bank fraud and business fraud, they 
consistently emphasise the role of petty crime.32 A 
study by Emilie Oftedal examines the financing of 
40 jihadist plots between 1994 and 2013: although 
nearly three-quarters generated at least some of 
their income from legal sources, she shows that 
criminality played a significant role, with nearly 
40 percent of the plots drawing on the proceeds 
of crime.33
Our database suggests that jihadists continue to do 
what they are familiar with, and so their criminal 
fundraising merely involves a change of purpose 
rather than a change of behaviour. The perpetrators 
of the January 2015 Paris attacks showed this. Saïd 
Kouachi, for example, sold counterfeit goods and 
received money from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Not all of this money went into funding 
the Charlie Hebdo attack, but some of it did.34 How 
is it possible to distinguish one from the other? 
Amedy Coulibaly, on the other hand, was selling 
drugs only a month before the attacks, in addition 
to being owed street debts worth €30,000.35 
32 Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp (2015), 
‘Understanding terrorist finance: Modus operandi and national 
CTF regimes’, Swedish Defence University, 18 December.
33 Emilie Oftedal (2015), ‘The financing of jihadi 
terrorist cells in Europe,’ FFI Report, Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, p.3, p.19, and p.26.
34 Katrin Bennhold and Eric Schmitt (2015), ‘Gaps in 
France’s Surveillance Are Clear; Solutions Aren’t,’ New York Times, 
17 February.
35 BBC (2015), ‘Paris attacks: Investigators turn up new 
Coulibaly did not need to change his criminal 
fundraising tactics. In these cases, the common 
thread was not any particular source of funding 
(be it counterfeits, drugs or cash) but personal 
continuity. Therefore, it can be difficult to separate 
funds raised for terrorism from money spent on 
other, often entirely mundane, purposes.36
Conclusion
The convergence of criminal and terrorist milieus 
– what we call the new crime-terror nexus – is 
real, and has profound implications for how 
jihadist groups in Europe operate. For the first 
time, there is near-complete alignment between a 
group like Islamic State and criminals attracted by 
its core counter-cultural message of redemption 
through strength, power and violence. Islamic 
State and/or its successors increasingly find 
recruits in European ‘ghettos,’ in prisons, among 
the European ‘underclasses’ and those who have 
previously engaged in violence and illegal acts. 
Thus, those who are becoming part of the jihadist 
counter-culture can apply their criminal skills 
to terrorist purposes. Indeed, many individuals 
continue their involvement in crime whilst 
radicalising.
Countering terrorism, therefore, needs to address 
this social aspect of the problem. However, more 
attention also needs to be paid to prisons and to 
countering ‘petty’ and organised crime (as well 
as the people engaging in it). Institutional silos – 
for example, the separation between countering 
crime and countering terrorism, or between 
counter-terrorism and ‘criminal’ police – need 
to be broken down. There may also be a case for 
more collaboration between security agencies and 
local authorities, and also the private sector, for 
example in public-private partnerships. 
leads,’ BBC News, 19 January; and L’Obs, 2015, ‘J-12 jours avant 
“Charlie” et l’Hyper Cacher: récit d’un effroyable compte à rebours’, 
L’Obs, 24 February.
36 Peter R. Neumann (2017), ‘Don’t Follow The Money: 
The Problem With the War on Terrorist Financing,’ Foreign Affairs, 
July/August issue.
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Not least, many assumptions about radicalisation 
need to be reconsidered, e.g. that a pious 
person is not likely to also be a criminal or that 
someone ‘acting like a gangster’ cannot possibly 
be also involved in terrorism. With criminal and 
terrorism milieus merging, the fight against crime 
has become – to a significant extent – a national 
security issue.
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In a relatively short period of time – three 
years – the so-called Islamic State (IS) terrorist 
organisation has managed to revolutionise jihadist 
propaganda online. Because of its sheer volume, 
penetrating messages and strategic exploitation 
of the internet and social media vulnerabilities, 
IS media content in the virtual space is expected 
to survive any contraction of the organisation on 
the ground. The aim of this paper is to shed light 
on how IS adapts its communication strategy on 
the internet in order to expand its virtual presence 
in the face of territorial loss. This involves the 
employment of market promotion techniques and 
taking advantage of the user generated content 
(UGC) that IS sympathisers produce on social 
media. A core argument of the paper is that 
containment of the IS presence online depends 
on a deeper understanding of IS communication 
strategies on the internet so that a public-private 
response can be designed.
Since the announcement of the caliphate in mid-
2014, IS has followed an aggressive social media 
campaign aiming to magnify the impact of 
military victories in Syria and Iraq and to bring 
wider audiences to support its cause. Compared to 
al-Qaeda’s (AQ) use of the internet for propaganda 
purposes, IS’s approach of publicising its atrocities 
against captives and openly threatening non-
affiliated jihadist groups, including AQ itself, at 
first sight appeared risky and potentially counter-
productive. Nevertheless, the organisation’s 
traction on social media demonstrates that the IS 
communication strategists have understood how 
digital technology and especially the proliferation 
of mobile devices have changed the structure of 
communication from a hierarchical system, in 
which terrorist organisations disseminated their 
messages to followers through tightly controlled 
internet forums, to a horizontal structure, in which 
the spread of the message is based on peer-to-peer 
dissemination.1 In fact, it is through a seemingly 
decentralised network of media operatives on 
social media that IS ensures its message gets 
across to social media users and resonates with its 
targeted audiences. 
It is worth noting that the first generation of 
AQ militants were reluctant to use the internet 
in their communications or to disseminate the 
organisation’s propaganda. Usama bin Laden’s 
preferred practice was to use couriers to deliver 
his pre-recorded audio or video messages to 
media outlets with global outreach for their 
broadcast.2 Furthermore, the first dedicated 
jihadist discussion forums were created as late as 
2003.3 These forums were publicly advertised by 
supporters, after AQ-affiliated static websites had 
1 For a detailed analysis of the impact of digital 
technology on IS strategic communications, see The Nato 
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (2017), Strategic 
Communications: Insights from the commercial sector, http://
www.stratcomcoe.org/strategic-communications-insights-
commercial-sector 




3 Anne Stenersen, “The history of the jihadi forums”, 
Jihadica.com, 04/03/2009 www.jihadica.com/the-history-of-the-
jihadi-forums
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repeatedly been taken down.4 With time, however, 
jihadist organisations realised the importance of 
the internet to their effort to develop their strategic 
communications model. Media operatives on the 
internet became responsible for polishing the 
brand of the organisation, spreading its message 
to followers and sympathisers and carrying out the 
digital jihad against the organisation’s detractors 
online. In fact, the ‘media mujahid’ was granted 
equal status to the mujahid who fights the jihad on 
the physical battlefield.5
Nonetheless, this system was based on a series of 
rigid checks and balances. Until late 2012, much 
of the ‘media jihad’ was conducted in internet 
jihadist forums that performed, among other 
things, the function of content authenticator on 
the latest propaganda releases. In addition, the 
administrators of the forums were responsible 
for editing out any cacophony coming from 
disenchanted followers in order to safeguard the 
consistency of the jihadist message. However, in 
early 2013 a significant shift of jihadist activity 
from forums to social media such as Twitter and 
Facebook took place.6 This tendency was further 
intensified, resulting in a rapid degradation 
of jihadist forums by the end of 2014.7 Beside 
structural problems, such as limited outreach to 
the public, a constant fear of infiltration and the 
resulting suspicion8 and dissatisfaction of some 
4 Awan, Akil N. and al-Lami, Mina (2009) “Al-Qa’ida’s 
virtual crisis,” The RUSI Journal, 154:1, pp. 56-64.
5 Ranstorp, Magnus and Normak, Magnus eds. (2015) 
Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and 
Beyond, Routledge, pp. 118-119.
6 Bunzel, Cole, (2013) Are the Jihadi Forums Flagging? 
An Ideologue’s Lament www.jihadica.com/are-the-jihadi-forums-
flagging-an-ideologue’s-lament/ 
7 Weimann, Gunnar (2017) “Squirting venom on Twitter,” 
paper presented at the TASM Conference at Swansea University in 
June 2017.
8 Hegghammer, Thomas (2014) “Interpersonal trust on 
jihadi Internet forums,” draft chapter to be included in Diego 
Gambetta (ed.), Fight, Flight, Mimic: Identity Signalling in Armed 
Conflicts, forthcoming, available at http://hegghammer.com/_files/
Interpersonal_trust.pdf 
members, a major reason behind this development 
was the falling-out between AQ and ISIL9 after the 
latter’s rejection of al-Zawahiri’s admonishment 
to leave the leading role in the Syrian jihadist 
opposition to Jabhat al-Nusra.10
An assertive IS after the fall of Mosul, and in 
particular the announcement of the caliphate in 
mid-2014, encountered no constraints on the 
use of social media to project its totalitarian plan 
for the region. Its communication strategy was 
based on the following elements: a multi-layered 
message targeting a variety of audiences from IS 
members to sympathisers, to Sunni Muslims in 
general, to enemies (including those Muslims who 
did not accept IS’s claim to Muslim leadership); 
a massive production of high-quality movie-
style propaganda; an apparent decentralization; 
and the use of popular social media platforms, 
such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Google 
services, for the dissemination of its products. In 
this early phase, Twitter appears to have played 
an instrumental role in the conveyance of the 
IS online strategy. The popularity and speed of 
message delivery of this social media platform 
ensured that the IS message was rapidly delivered 
to large audiences of sympathisers, enemies and 
unconcerned users.11 On release, each new IS 
propaganda item is circulated by a large pool of 
core disseminators (IS media operatives) using 
dedicated hashtags to create the necessary traction 
before reaching the larger Twitter network. The 
tweets include links to other social media, such 
as YouTube and Facebook, where the content 
can be accessed and downloaded.12 Quick and 
agile movement among social media platforms 
9  “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” was the predecessor 
organisation to “Islamic State”.
10 Weimann, G. (2017) 
11 According to Stratcom research, “The speed at which 
messages can be delivered in the contemporary information 
environment is at least as important as their content. The first 
message delivered in audience dialogue is the loudest and sets the 
pace in controlling the subsequent debate,” p. 18.
12 Weimann, G. (2017)
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enhances the resilience of the jihadist online 
network against any disruptive attempt. In fact, the 
IS dispersed network of social media accounts has 
been described as a “swarmcast which constantly 
reconfigures much like the way a swarm of bees or 
flock of birds constantly reorganises in mid-flight 
[allowing for] the persistent presence of jihadist 
content online.”13 
In parallel, IS employs marketing techniques 
to promote its products online. High-profile 
propaganda items, such as major video 
productions, are announced with teasers in a 
“coming soon” phase that can last one to two days 
before the actual release of the item. This maximises 
followers’ anticipation and attracts the attention of 
other users. The launch of new propaganda items is 
accompanied by aggressive dissemination tactics 
on Twitter through the activation of dormant 
accounts, bots and the use of dedicated hashtags 
or hijacked hashtags advertising popular events.14 
Outlinks embedded in the tweets point to the 
content in other social media, such as streaming 
platforms and file-sharing sites, magnifying the 
impact of the dissemination of the new item. The 
last part of this three-phase strategy consists of re-
cycling the material online at intervals through re-
uploads, by advertising new links and by making 
references to it in new propaganda productions.  
Initially, a slow and uncoordinated reaction to 
terrorist abuse of social media granted IS media 
operatives the necessary room to extend their 
influence, making IS propaganda noticeable 
across the spectrum of social media users and 
attracting new followers.15 The more committed 
13 Fisher, Ali (2015) Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks 
Maintain a Persistent Online Presence, Perspectives on Terrorism, 
vol. 9, no. 3 http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/426/html 
14 Milmo, Cahal (2014) “Isis jihadists using World Cup 




15 In Autumn 2014, various studies calculated the number 
among them probably spend hours online to 
further spread IS propaganda and also themselves 
generate and circulate material in support of 
the terrorist organisation. These new jihadist 
‘prosumers’ on social media have been labelled 
‘ISIS fanboys’ because they combine their pledge 
to join the fight against the enemies of IS in the 
virtual domain with their fascination with geek 
culture.16 Thus, official IS propaganda seems to 
be circulated by core disseminators first before 
being further disseminated by IS fanboys, often 
accompanied with their own UGC. 
Towards the end of 2015, and especially in the 
aftermath of the 13 November attacks in Paris, 
drastic action undertaken jointly by governmental 
organisations, civil society and social media 
companies resulted in the disruption of much of 
IS activity on at least some of the major social 
media platforms.17 This forced the IS media 
operatives to move to less hostile social media 
to implement their communication strategy.18 
In fact, throughout 2016, Telegram became 
increasingly the platform of choice for the IS 
online community as it allowed for a relatively 
free space in which the preparation of jihadist 
media campaigns (ghazawat i’lamiyya) could 
of pro-IS accounts on Twitter as being in the area 45,000-70,000. 
For example, see Berger, J.M. and Morgan, Jonathon (2015) “The 
ISIS Twitter Census,” Brookings Analysis paper no. 20 https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter_census_
berger_morgan.pdf and Statista (2014) “Twitter presence of ISIS 
as of Fall 2014,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/412435/isis-
twitter-accounts-tweets/ 
16 Frenkel, Sheera (2014) “Meet The “ISIS Fanboys Spreading 
The Message Of Iraq’s Most Feared Terror Group”, https://www.
buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/meet-the-isis-fanboys-spreading-the-
message-of-iraqs-most-fe?utm_term=.wxjwn5OQe#.wgzxog0P9  
17 Europol “Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016,” 
pp. 16-17. https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf, Yadron, Danny (2016) Twitter 
deletes 125,000 Isis accounts and expands anti-terror teams, https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/05/twitter-deletes-
isis-accounts-terrorism-online
18 Europol “Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,” 
p. 29 https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-
reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 
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be initiated.19 To this end, IS core disseminators, 
having privileged access to new content, prepare 
the ground for upcoming propaganda releases by 
simultaneously posting announcements, banners 
and teasers in ‘mirror channels’ on Telegram.20 
This signals to the community of IS sympathisers 
on Telegram that a time for coordinated action is 
approaching, meaning the aggressive promotion 
of new content across social media. Since Telegram 
is a closed environment which is not indexed by 
search engines, and its content cannot be accessed 
by the general public unless they join the pro-IS 
channels, it is the role of both core disseminators 
and IS sympathisers on Telegram to advertise 
new content on more accessible social media 
platforms. The IS fanboys activate a vast network 
of dormant accounts and bots, upload the content 
to file-sharing sites and streaming platforms and 
share the links with the public in a very short time 
after the release of the new propaganda item.21 
What needs to be noted in this process is the 
authentication of IS products. As mentioned, 
official IS propaganda is first advertised and 
circulated by the core disseminators, who have 
privileged access to new content as they are part 
of the IS propaganda apparatus. Authenticity is 
validated through the simultaneous appearance of 
new content on the core disseminators’ Telegram 
‘mirror channels.’ This simple but rigorous system 
of validation eliminates any disinformation attempt 
by outsiders, as was shown by a failed attempt to 
plant fake RUMIYAH issues in the circulation 
model of IS official content. Monthly RUMIYAH, 
the flagship IS magazine addressing audiences in 
19 Prucha, Nico (2016) “IS and the Jihadist Information 
Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via 
Telegram,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 10, No 6 http://www.
terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/556/html
20 For more information on IS mirror channels on 
Telegram, see Smith, Laura (2017), Messaging app Telegram 
centrepiece of IS social media strategy http://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-39743252
21 Europol “Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,” 
p. 29 https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-
reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 
eleven languages other than Arabic, is by its nature 
one of the core instruments of IS propaganda. For 
several issues between no. 3 (November 2016) and 
no. 10 (June 2017), the release of the original IS 
product was preceded a few hours earlier by fake 
versions of RUMIYAH uploaded on seemingly 
pro-IS channels on Telegram in an apparent effort 
to confuse supporters or collect information 
on them through malware embedded in the pdf 
file.22 Despite the fact that the fake RUMIYAH 
issues were the result of a sophisticated effort to 
replicate the original production, their circulation 
on Telegram and Twitter did not take off as they 
were not supported by the core disseminators’ 
channels.23 Consequently, the fake issues were not 
picked up by the community of IS fanboys either, 
putting a swift end to the attempted disinformation 
campaign. 
The above observation is connected with the 
outreach of IS’s propaganda to audiences at present. 
The production and dissemination of official IS 
propaganda continues to be centrally orchestrated 
and not outsourced to IS fanboys. Nevertheless, 
after reaching its peak in mid-2015 propaganda 
production has been in steady decline ever since.24 
This can be considered to be largely the result of 
the targeted killing of a number of central figures 
22 Khayat, M. (2017) Release Of Two Suspicious Fifth 
Issues Of ISIS’s ‘Rumiyah’ Magazine – Timeline, Characteristics, 
And Takeaways, MEMRI https://www.memri.org/jttm/release-
two-suspicious-fifth-issues-isiss-rumiyah-magazine-–-timeline-
characteristics-and 
23 Fake Rumiyah no. 5 included fully-fledged articles with 
themes that closely resembled those in previous original Rumiyah 
issues. Fake Rumiyah no. 7 contained the exact titles of articles that 
later appeared in the original copy of the same issue, betraying an 
insider as the party behind the disinformation campaign.
24 West Point’s CTC observed that the number of new 
propaganda visual releases dropped from 700 unique items per 
month in August 2015 to less than 200 items in August 2016. This 
figure must have dropped to half by mid-2017. What is worth 
noting is the fact that most of these items are short unedited videos 
from the battlefield and photo reports. Instead, high profile video 
production in 2017 is in free fall. See also MIton, Daniel (2016), 
Communication Breakdown: Unravelling the Islamic State’s Media 
Efforts, CTC West Point https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf 
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in the IS propaganda machinery by coalition 
forces. It has put the terrorist organisation’s 
media department under severe pressure.25 In the 
face of a significantly lower volume of IS official 
propaganda, what is gaining in visibility is UGC 
produced by IS fanboys. Running their own 
Telegram channels, they react individually to major 
events (i.e. in the aftermath of terrorist attacks), 
producing content such as memes and banners 
that glorifies IS acts. Occasionally IS fanboys’ UGC 
threatens new attacks, identifies targets and incites 
‘lone actors’ to continue with the terrorist plotting. 
Normally, this type of UGC does not make it to 
the mainstream social media but remains within 
the confines of the fanboys’ channels that post it. 
The reason is that UGC is not picked up by IS’s 
core disseminators to enter the dissemination 
process. The multiplicity of fanboys’ channels and 
the usual suspicion of infiltration attempts deter 
the IS propaganda machinery from appropriating 
any such content as official material. Nonetheless, 
the heightened alert about the IS threat is quite 
often leading IS propaganda observers26 to bring 
to the surface the fanboys’ UGC, confusing it 
or mixing it up with official IS propaganda. In 
several cases, reports based on UGC have hit the 
traditional media headlines, contributing to a 
climate of public fear and insecurity. Therefore, 
it appears that anti-IS actors can be responsible 
for bringing terrorist threats that do not come 
from the terrorist organisation itself to public 
attention, inadvertently playing the game of the IS 
propagandists. 
Acknowledging this development can help the 
devising of better strategies for the containment 
of IS propaganda online. Although the massive 
production of high-quality IS propaganda in 
recent years will help the terrorist organisation 
to maintain a significant online presence in the 
25  “Operation Inherent Resolve” Press Release (2017) 
“Coalition removes ISIS leaders from battlefield http://www.
inherentresolve.mil/News/News-Releases/Article/1259778/
coalition-removes-isis-leaders-from-battlefield/ 
26  This category includes research sites, jihadi monitoring 
sites, traditional media and individual CT researchers.
future, its impact of radicalising individuals 
can be mitigated by restricting public access to 
it. First, because the IS propaganda apparatus 
is centrally controlled and dissemination 
centrally orchestrated, further loss in terms of 
infrastructure and territory is expected to have an 
increasingly adverse impact on new propaganda 
production. Targeting the core disseminators 
in social media can also impact its circulation 
mechanism. Second, private-public synergies 
can widen the range of actors engaging in the 
disruption of terrorist propaganda. Government 
agencies and larger social media companies can 
share their experiences in the field with smaller, 
in terms of resources, companies and civil society, 
forging a common front against terrorist abuse of 
the internet. Finally, better assessment of UGC as 
opposed to IS official terrorist propaganda and 
putting limitations on the publicising of it would 
further curb the terrorist organisation’s outreach 
to online audiences.
Conclusions
IS strategic communications online have 
undergone a fundamental change. A recent 
loss of media infrastructure and resources has 
considerably curtailed the terrorist organisation’s 
capabilities to produce new high-quality 
propaganda. Its dissemination model online 
is also facing significant challenges as social 
media companies and government organisations 
intensify their disruptive efforts. The combination 
of the above factors leads to attention to UGC 
produced by IS fanboys as a substitute for official 
IS content. Nonetheless, a clear separation between 
IS official propaganda and UGC is needed in 
order to conduct a more accurate assessment of 
the terrorist threat online. Based on that, public 
authorities, civil society and private parties can 
build tailored measures aiming to disintegrate IS’s 
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Terrorism is a social and political phenomenon 
but it is also a practical public policy challenge. 
The UK, regrettably, has a long experience of 
terrorism, and its approach to terrorist threats 
in the last fifty years has been deeply influenced 
by its experience of, and response to, terrorism 
relating to the affairs of Northern Ireland. During 
the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland from the early 
1970s, the British state was faced at the same time 
with extensive sectarian and inter-communal 
violence in Northern Ireland, organised violent 
resistance to the state authorities in Northern 
Ireland, and an intermittent but persistent 
campaign of terrorist attacks in Britain, which 
over time included attacks on ‘soft’ civilian targets, 
attacks on public and military figures and attacks 
on the national and financial infrastructure of 
Britain. 
The UK Counter Terrorist 
Strategy
The UK’s response to the 9/11 attacks was 
therefore built on pre-existing policy assumptions, 
legal measures and institutional geography that 
had been developed over the preceding thirty 
years. The UK government’s counterterrorist 
strategy, CONTEST, which was designed in the 
post-9/11 period under the leadership of Sir 
David Omand, then Security Co-ordinator in 
the Cabinet Office, who himself had worked on 
Northern Ireland issues, is thus an evolutionary 
rather than a revolutionary document. It has 
also been remarkably resilient in policy terms 
– although there have been reiterations of the 
policy in the fifteen or so years since it was first 
agreed, its essence has remained unchanged 
and indeed the basic taxonomy that it applies in 
approaching terrorism has been recycled into 
the UK government’s approach to other threats, 
notably serious and organised crime.
The CONTEST strategy consists of four strands, 
which are:
PURSUE – focussing on actions to identify, 
investigate, disrupt and where possible prosecute 
those who are engaged in terrorism or in the 
promotion of terrorism.  This is work that falls 
principally but not entirely on the intelligence 
services, the police and the criminal justice system.
PROTECT – which aims to reduce the 
vulnerability of critical national infrastructure 
and other vulnerable sites to terrorist attack. 
PROTECT has had considerable success but as 
terrorist methodologies evolve PROTECT has 
also had to adapt. Protection of critical national 
infrastructure is a relatively defined problem 
but the vulnerability of public places to attack is 
more amorphous. The initial focus on reducing 
the vulnerability of the transport network and 
of major public events encouraged the terrorists 
to look elsewhere, in particular by mounting 
‘marauding’ attacks such as those seen in Paris 
and more recently in the London Bridge area, or 
by using vehicles as a weapon as in Nice, Berlin 
and on the bridges of London. The PROTECT 
programme has therefore had to respond to these 
evolutions of the threat, and protective measures 
on bridges in London are now on the agenda. The 
problem for policy makers, however, is that the 
initiative for where to attack lies with the terrorists 
and the options available to them are more or less 
infinite. Therefore, vulnerabilities will always exist 
that terrorists will be able to exploit.
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PREPARE –  the level of damage that any 
particular terrorist attack can cause is related not 
only to the severity of the initial incident itself 
but also to the ability of society to respond to the 
attack and re-establish normal life afterwards. 
This is to say that the damage from terrorism can 
be reduced if we increase the resilience of our 
societies. In order to ensure that recovery from 
an attack is as rapid as possible, the government 
needs to be able to manage the initial crisis and 
to have available appropriate expert resources to 
manage the aftermath. The UK government has 
well-established crisis management arrangements 
headed by the COBR committee, which brings 
together relevant parts of government and the 
public sector to ensure that necessary steps are co-
ordinated. Ensuring that the necessary resources 
are available to manage the aftermath is in itself a 
significant task: ensuring that the health services 
can respond adequately, that there are facilities 
to decontaminate after a radiological or chemical 
attack, that in the event of a large-scale loss of life 
it is possible to deal with the dead, and so on. This 
involves many parts of government that are less 
familiar with national security matters and these 
all need to be able to work together, sometimes 
with unfamiliar partners. Therefore, PREPARE 
involves a continuing and complex programme of 
work.
PREVENT – since terrorism is a complex social 
and political phenomenon, it is evident that 
a response to it which is solely based around 
traditional security techniques is unlikely to be 
wholly successful.  While it is hard to imagine that 
the fissiparous, international and extreme groups 
that pose a terrorist threat today are ever likely to 
come together to negotiate a political solution to 
the grievances they believe they have, nevertheless 
it needs to be recognised that political, social 
and economic factors may have an influence on 
the extent to which terrorist groups are able to 
successfully promote their ideologies and to recruit 
new members both overseas and domestically. It 
is therefore important to do all that can be done 
to push back against the extremist narrative and 
to bolster moderate voices within communities 
targeted by the extremists so that the terrorists’ 
job of promoting extremism and recruiting 
new terrorists is made as difficult as possible. In 
many ways, this is the most difficult of the four 
strands of the CONTEST strategy since the levers 
available to government are limited, the outcomes 
slow to build, and most Western governments 
are ill-equipped to counter what are presented as 
religious arguments on the part of the extremists. 
As a result, the PREVENT programme is at the 
same time the most important, the most difficult 
and the most controversial of the CONTEST 
strands, and one where progress can be the most 
difficult to demonstrate.      
From a personal perspective, I would add a fifth 
P to the CONTEST strategy, and that P stands 
for PERSEVERANCE. We have faced terrorism 
in Europe arising from Islamist extremism for 
over 15 years (and if you include the terrorist 
attacks in France in the 1990s arising from the 
Algerian crisis then for more than 20 years). 
Although the threat has increased and decreased 
periodically, and although the way in which the 
threat manifests itself has developed, as has its 
geographical footprint, overall there is no reason 
to think that the threat has been exhausted. This 
means that ‘winning’ against terrorism is unlikely, 
at least in the short or medium term. The threat 
is likely to persist. We need to develop policies 
that enable us to minimise and marginalise the 
harm that terrorists can do, and push back against 
their propaganda. However, this is a marathon 
not a sprint. At each step, we need to consider 
what the long-term effect of our own actions will 
be and refuse to take steps that will in the longer 
term play into the terrorist’s hands. We should 
also continue to emphasise the resilience and 
stability of our societies, which in reality terrorists 
can do little to damage at the strategic level. 
While every attack is an outrage, and for victims 
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the impact can be horrific, we should not give 
terrorists the gratification of believing that their 
actions will ultimately destabilise or threaten our 
fundamental stability or our values. This means 
that we resolutely continue to take the necessary 
steps to counter terrorism but we also refuse to 
sensationalise or glamorise what terrorists are 
doing. Perhaps, surprisingly, President Trump has 
this right – the terrorists are ‘losers’.
Themes from the development 
of Counterterrorism
The CONTEST strategy has set the framework 
for the UK’s response to terrorism over the last 15 
years, but I will highlight three themes that have 
also played out over the same period: resources, 
integration and technology. 
RESOURCES.  From a relatively low base at 
9/11, the British government has spent billions 
of pounds on counterterrorism over a 15-year 
period. It spent around £800m on the security and 
intelligence agencies in 2000-2001. The equivalent 
figure in 2015-2016 was approaching £3bn. The 
budget is thus two and a half times larger allowing 
for inflation, and it continues to increase in real 
terms. Counterterrorist policing has also seen 
huge increases, and there have been increases in 
many other departmental programmes.  Even 
discounting the costs of the military campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, counterterrorism does not 
come cheap. 
INTEGRATION. The second theme of UK 
counter-terrorism over this period has been 
integration of effort. The three UK intelligence 
agencies have worked increasingly closely 
together as globalisation and the ubiquity of 
digital technology have challenged traditional 
institutional boundaries and made operational 
success dependent on close collaboration. The 
same drivers of change have brought integration 
between the intelligence community and law 
enforcement as both sides have recognised that 
their interests are aligned and that success follows 
integration not separation. The same issues have 
driven closer international integration of law 
enforcement and security intelligence effort, both 
through bilateral exchanges and though more 
institutionalised structures. Again, there is no 
reason to think that this trend towards integration 
is likely to slow, as common threats require 
common responses. BREXIT is clearly a threat 
in this area but there is a strong interest on both 
sides to maintain links. This may be simpler for 
intelligence co-operation, where the arrangements 
are not within EU competence. Law enforcement 
co-operation through EUROPOL will require 
more formal renegotiation.
TECHNOLOGY. The third theme has been 
the increasing importance of technology in 
countering terrorism. This has gone hand in hand 
with developments in the digital sphere more 
widely across society, which have been exploited 
by terrorists, many of whom are now ‘digital 
natives’ and naturally turn to the internet to solve 
their problems and take forward their ambitions. 
While each step in technology can pose problems 
for the security and law enforcement authorities, 
each step also offers opportunities. The emergence 
of mobile telephony in the late 1990s was initially 
seen as problematic to the security authorities as it 
enabled terrorists and criminals to communicate 
easily from wherever they were in the world. It 
did not take long, of course, for the authorities to 
realise that it enabled them to track the location 
of suspects wherever they were in the world. 
Subsequently, communications data from mobile 
telephones have become a vital source of evidence 
in criminal prosecutions for all sorts of offences, 
as well as being a valuable intelligence resource. 
Of course, this has meant updating legislation so 
that the new opportunities open to the authorities 
are used on a legal, proportionate and accountable 
basis, but in the UK there has been a fairy broad 
political consensus that these powers are needed 
and should be available subject to the appropriate 
safeguards. 
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More complex has been the discussion over the 
use of bulk data as an intelligence resource. The 
reasons that this is controversial are obvious – 
that it involves the processing by the authorities 
of data relating to innocent citizens in order to 
identify the activities of terrorists and criminals. 
In practice, the actual level of intrusion involved 
can be limited through the anonymization of data 
in big data sets and the use that the techniques 
are put to can be subject to rigorous judicial 
scrutiny and accountability, but the issues arising 
are still complex. What is indisputable is that the 
mining of ‘big data’ provides a powerful way of 
understanding the world, including threatening 
activity within that world, which is why it is of 
such interest to commercial companies, whose ‘big 
data’ activities are much more extensive and less 
accountable than those of the security authorities. 
Conclusion
For all the investment, technological innovation 
and legislative activity of the last 15 years, 
terrorism is still a real threat in Europe, both 
to the lives of our citizens and to the coherence 
of our communities. How much we allow it to 
be a genuinely destabilising force is to some 
extent in our own hands.  Perseverance in our 
counterterrorist efforts will be vital but two things 
seem to me to be paramount. These two things 
are continuing to counter the grievance narrative 
of our enemies through words and deeds, and 
continuing to integrate our efforts. But integration 
and intelligence sharing are only as valuable as 
the insights that each partner can bring and there 
cannot be passengers. This means that all partners 
need to have the capabilities to investigate threats, 
deliver intelligence and take appropriate action. 
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Terrorism may not be more dangerous but it is 
certainly becoming more complex and diverse. 
We are now confronting prepositioned ISIL cells 
and lone actors – some of whom are directed 
from Raqqa or Deir az Zour, while others are 
self-inspired. A few years ago, ISIL leader Abou 
Moussa al Suri predicted that terrorist attacks 
would come in the form of 1,000 small cuts, 
and this is what we are now seeing with a spate 
of small-scale attacks in London, Manchester, 
Stockholm, Paris, Brussels and Dortmund. Those 
likely to attack are vulnerable and frustrated, 
and some are mentally ill. Many attackers have a 
criminal past (812 confirmed hits out of the 5,000 
foreign terrorist fighters who have travelled from 
Europe to Iraq and Syria). The role of the internet 
has increased in line with the 18-fold increase in 
internet traffic across borders between 2005 and 
2012. The terrorists have used migration as a 
transit route and sought refugees as recruits. There 
are also more women (around 20% of the total) 
and converts involved in ISIL than ever before.
Our response has improved, but some 2,500 
foreign terrorist fighters are still believed to 
remain in Iraq and Syria. Many have been or will 
be killed as the counter-ISIL coalition recaptures 
Mosul and Raqqa, but others will seek to return 
to Europe battle-hardened or relocate elsewhere 
and join other groups. Sinai and Libya are of 
1 The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the 
author alone. They should not be construed as representing an official 
position of NATO but are contributed in a purely personal capacity.
increasing concern and Sunni disillusionment 
with the way in which geopolitics seem to favour 
Shia or Kurdish interests against their community 
will facilitate the emergence of new Sunni jihadist 
groups, especially if the Iraqi government cannot 
achieve good governance, reconstruction and the 
return of displaced civilians to cities such as Mosul, 
Ramadi and Fallujah. Small groups may well fuse 
into a new Al Qaeda franchise and the recent focus 
on the elimination of ISIL’s caliphate has meant 
that other well-armed and organized groups, such 
as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, have been left largely 
unscathed. They have been developing advanced 
explosive devices, chemical weapons, drones with 
grenades, the miniaturization of components, 
dirty bombs and synthetic biotechnologies. The 
easy availability of online learning, through 
MOOC courses for instance, makes it easier for 
the jihadists to convert know-how into capability.
The continuing reality and ongoing metamorphosis 
of the terrorist threat are forcing the transatlantic 
partners to develop an ever-broadening spectrum 
of policy responses, reflecting the clear conclusion 
that military operations can never provide a long-
term solution to terrorism. The EU, for instance, 
has pushed ahead with data collection and data 
transfer with the US (Privacy Shield), and also with 
the introduction of a passenger name recognition 
system for air travellers. It is striving to achieve a 
better balance between encryption and security 
and has engaged the major IT and internet 
companies in a voluntary arrangement to remove 
jihadist propaganda from the internet. In 2016, 
Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft agreed 
to cooperate to develop a database where they will 
mark terrorist content with a specified identifier. 
Other companies can then see this tagged content 
and remove it from their own sites. In Britain, a 
specialist anti-terror police unit removed 121,000 
pieces of terrorist content last year with the help of 
some 300 companies around the world. A similar 
referrals unit at Europol in The Hague has removed 
30,000 pieces, with a 90% success rate vis-à-vis the 
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internet service providers. An Internet Forum 
is engaging the private sector in a discussion on 
how more and better counter-narrative material 
can be put on line as part of the EU’s Prevent 
strategy. Some companies are experimenting 
with new tactics, such as Jigsaw, a sister company 
of Google, which has tested a ‘redirect method’ 
showing ads and videos to people looking for 
jihadist material on Google and YouTube. The 
Europol and Schengen databases are being better 
aligned and filled out with biometrics (with 8,000 
names now on file). The EU is also working on 
digital proof and its exploitation through Europol 
and Eurojust. The gathering of forensic evidence 
from the battlefield is particularly crucial. This 
can help to prepare for future trials of ISIL and 
other jihadist leaders. In the meantime, Frontex 
and Europol are now working together to achieve 
better border controls and management.
On the external front, and in the wake of the 
Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks in Paris, the 
EU member states have concentrated on their 
immediate neighbourhood, for instance Morocco, 
Tunisia and the western Balkans. The European 
External Action Service, the EU’s Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator and Europol’s Counter-
Terrorism Cell are setting up partnerships with 
most of the countries along the North African 
littoral, focusing on border management, aviation 
security, security sector reform, countering violent 
extremism and the rule of law. Under the Maltese 
EU Presidency, Ministers of Defence and of the 
Interior have met to better integrate the external 
military and internal police and intelligence 
services aspects of fighting terrorism.
This stepped-up level of EU activity, as well as the 
push from the Trump administration for NATO 
to have a more substantive and visible role in the 
fight against ISIL, has raised the question of the 
alliance’s added value as an actor against terrorism. 
Consequently, in the run-up to the mini-summit 
that NATO’s leaders held in Brussels last May, 
the 29 allies worked on an action plan to reflect 
a higher level of ambition for an organization 
normally associated with classic conventional 
deterrence and defence against threats from nation 
states. What are its principal novelties?
In the first place, and following a long-standing US 
request, NATO agreed to join the Counter-ISIL 
Coalition. There had been some debate within the 
alliance about the added value of this step, as all the 
allies had previously been coalition members on 
an individual basis. Moreover, some allies worried 
that in joining the Coalition NATO might become 
involved in combat operations or even be called 
upon to replace the coalition in a big country 
like Iraq in the wake of the recapture of Mosul 
and the end of formal coalition air and ground 
operations. On the other hand, the prospect of a 
seat at the table together with 70 countries and 
other international organizations (including the 
EU and Interpol) at Coalition meetings, as well as 
the useful exchange of information and analyses 
on the evolving terrorist threat, finally sealed the 
consensus in favour of Coalition membership. 
NATO has offered to use its AWACS aircraft 
based at Konya in Turkey in a more forward-
leaning role supporting not only air surveillance 
but also the coordination of air operations. At the 
time of writing, it is not clear what other tasks 
NATO might be asked to take on in the future. 
The Coalition’s focus is overwhelmingly on the 
recapture of Raqqa and the final rolling up of 
the ISIL caliphate in other areas, such as in the 
Euphrates Valley, Deir az Zour and Al Tanf. There 
is as yet little indication as to which direction 
the Coalition will take post-Raqqa, other than a 
general acceptance that it will remain in existence. 
NATO is already in Iraq, with a modest training 
and advisory mission helping the Iraqi forces with 
counter-explosives expertise, military medicine 
and the repair of military vehicles and equipment. 
This activity could be ramped up but the Coalition 
is also carrying out a great deal of training of local 
forces with the participation of many non-NATO 
countries and may well decide not to disrupt 
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these ongoing activities. Moreover, as part of the 
US strategy review of Afghanistan and pressure 
from the ISAF Commander, General Nicolson, 
the Allies are being asked to find more troops for 
the Afghanistan Resolute Support Mission. An 
effective NATO training role in Iraq would require 
a military headquarters and operation with force 
generation along the lines of Afghanistan, (not 
to speak of the demands of NATO’s Enhanced 
Forward Presence in Eastern Europe in terms 
of forward deployed troops headquarters and 
exercises and reinforcements). Consequently, 
these considerations might dampen NATO’s 
enthusiasm for a greatly expanded commitment 
to Iraq.
Other items in the list of 38 activities in the action 
plan will be easier to implement. A new Joint 
Intelligence and Security Division within NATO 
has been established, which will not only bring 
more intelligence products into the headquarters 
but also combine better military and civilian 
intelligence flows. A cell dedicated to terrorism is 
now operating and NATO’s battlefield intelligence 
distribution network (BICES) has been upgraded 
to handle biometrics and alpha-numeric 
information. A hub is also being established at the 
NATO Joint Forces Command Headquarters in 
Naples, which can combine intelligence fusion and 
assessment with the sending of mobile training 
teams to those partner countries in North Africa 
and the Middle East which participate in the 
Alliance’s defence capacity-building and stability-
projecting efforts. What part of the assessment 
should be carried out within NATO’s military 
command structure in the southern region and 
what part at NATO in Brussels, close to the EU 
and the law enforcement authorities, is an issue 
still to be determined.
Where training and defence capacity-building do 
not require a military operation but only a lighter 
footprint, it will be easier for NATO to provide 
support to the countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa. Kuwait has offered the alliance a 
regional training centre, where it can organize 
courses. A regional crisis management centre has 
already been established in Mauritius and there are 
plans to create a similar centre in Iraq as a potential 
deliverable for the next NATO summit in 2018. 
A NATO presence can be financed through trust 
funds or can be handled by a lead nation willing 
to take on the overall responsibility, something 
which the UK has offered to do in Jordan. What 
the alliance now needs to do is to determine 
whether it wishes to have a training presence in a 
large number of countries or whether to conduct 
more in-depth training in a smaller number, such 
as Jordan or Tunisia, where NATO has already 
established close political relationships. For 
instance, in Tunisia NATO has been helping to 
develop Special Operation Forces and a reform 
of the intelligence services, and in Jordan it has 
been carrying out counter-explosives training and 
also helping Jordan develop its first national cyber 
defence organization.
NATO also needs to explore the relative benefits 
of different types of approach; for instance, to 
focus on mobile training teams or an in-country 
presence or out-of-country training and how 
these can be most effectively combined. Given 
the fact that a great deal of money has been 
wasted or misspent in recent years in places such 
as Iraq or Afghanistan trying to train and equip 
local forces which have then under-performed in 
conflict, not to speak of high levels of corruption 
in those armed forces, NATO will also need to 
conduct a serious lessons-learned exercise. It 
will be important to look at doctrine, concepts, 
resources and processes to better understand how 
investments can be made more productive and 
sustainable and where the balance lies between 
what NATO can realistically expect local forces 
to do by themselves and where the support of 
foreign armies remains critical. The lessons of the 
recapture of Kunduz in Afghanistan and Mosul in 
Iraq demonstrate that local forces work far more 
effectively when they are helped in the front line 
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by western special forces and are provided with 
air and artillery support, battlefield intelligence, 
drones and medical evacuation. This approach 
also favours NATO countries. Whereas the US has 
suffered nearly 3,000 military deaths since 2001 in 
Afghanistan, it has thus far lost only 11 soldiers 
in the recent operations against ISIL in Iraq and 
Syria. Given the prevalence of corruption in local 
forces, NATO’s Building Integrity programme will 
need more funding and the alliance will need to 
direct its efforts precisely at those levels where 
it can be most influential. This would point to 
the development of leadership skills, doctrine 
and organization rather than the training and 
equipping of soldiers in the field, which arguably 
is done better by individual nations.
Finally, fighting terrorism will necessitate closer 
cooperation with the European Union. There 
are some things that NATO can do on its own 
without an EU contribution. Deterrence and 
defence in eastern Europe and nuclear burden-
sharing are two examples; but counter-terrorism 
is definitely not one of them. Here NATO will 
be effective only in proportion to its ability to 
engage more closely with the European Union. 
This is obvious in the case of maritime missions to 
cope with migration, such as the operation in the 
Aegean that NATO is conducting together with 
EU Frontex and also its support to the EU Sofia 
mission in the central Mediterranean, where both 
organizations are coordinating patrolling, logistics 
support and intelligence-sharing. If NATO begins 
a new mission in Libya in the near future (and 
the Libyan government has requested NATO 
support), this only makes sense in cooperation 
with the European Union, which will need to take 
responsibility for border management and the 
setting up of a new police service and judiciary. 
Libya is too big and too complicated for NATO 
to handle by itself and the resources of the EU 
for development aid and institution-building far 
outstrip what NATO has in its commonly funded 
budgets. On the other hand, NATO could also help 
the EU. The collection of battlefield intelligence 
would help the EU to track returning foreign 
fighters, and the experience of fighting piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden has shown how NATO assets, 
such as observation drones, biometrics collection 
and weapons intelligence can be useful to EU 
law enforcement, particularly Europol. Last year, 
at its summit in Warsaw, NATO agreed a joint 
declaration with the EU to enhance interaction 
in 42 specific areas. These provide for more 
cooperation on capability development, hybrid 
warfare and cyber security, but the declaration is 
relatively thin on counter-terrorism cooperation. 
This is an area that could be further developed 
as another deliverable for NATO’s summit next 
year. Apart from Libya and maritime operations, 
NATO and the EU could consult more closely on 
capacity-building, particularly in North Africa. 
Could NATO support the new G5 regional group 
that France has helped establish in the Sahel? 
What about more joint analysis and information-
sharing? Or closer cooperation with Europol 
(which incidentally would be useful in the area of 
cyber crime, as well as counterterrorism)? 
In conclusion, NATO’s future role in 
counterterrorism will depend on two factors. 
The first is its ability to develop a coherent and 
long-term strategic vision for the south and the 
programmes and resources for effective capacity-
building in a large enough number of countries 
to achieve a lasting strategic impact. The second 
is a closer working relationship with the EU, 
which could not only extend to North Africa but 
which could usefully cover parts of the western 
Balkans, such as Bosnia or Kosovo, from which 
many foreign fighters have left to join ISIL. The 
political pressure for the alliance to raise its game 
is definitely there and as NATO’s recent mini-
summit showed, it comes not just from President 
Trump but from many European allies, who 
notwithstanding Russia’s incursions into Ukraine 
and Crimea continue to see terrorism as the 
number one threat. NATO’s action plan is a good 
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start, but as one NATO leader said at the recent 
Brussels meeting, “we need to put the action into 
the plan.” To this, I would add “and look at further 
steps in the near future.”





Head of NATO’s Counter Terrorism section
The European Union’s mandate enables it to cover 
almost as many counter terrorism (CT) related 
issues as its component nations; by contrast, 
NATO’s range is more modest and is firmly 
located at the military end of the CT spectrum. 
But both organisations have unique strengths 
and a duty to contribute as effectively as possible 
to the international effort against terrorism. In 
May 2017, the leaders of all the NATO nations 
endorsed a report on NATO’s CT role to date 
and a challenging new Action Plan of measures 
designed to enhance NATO’s overall contribution. 
Despite the profound resolve of NATO nations in 
the field of CT, external commentators continue 
to see the Action Plan as a response to pressure 
from Donald Trump conveyed in a series of tweets 
in 2016 and 2017.2 In this context, this short piece 
by Juliette Bird adopts an avian theme as it sets out 
where NATO has got to and where it is headed as 
it plays its part in the international fight against 
terrorism.
First flight
In 2001, NATO lurched into the void like a 
fledgling, taking its first and most dramatic action 
against terrorism in response to the 9/11 attacks 
on the United States. This external attack on an 
1 This paper was first delivered to the Conference on 
Terrorism and European Security Governance of the European 
University Institute in June 2017 as the author’s own views. It is not 
an official NATO position.
2 In March 2016, then presidential candidate Donald 
Trump tweeted “NATO is obsolete and must be changed to 
additionally focus on terrorism….”
ally prompted NATO’s first, and to date only, use of 
the collective defence mechanism provided for in 
Article 5 of its founding treaty. The attack and the 
need for a response came as a shock to the NATO 
system; terrorism had not previously been viewed 
as a major threat and no policy, doctrine or staff 
structures were in place, and neither had NATO’s 
intelligence structures been consistently focused 
on the issue. A hastily constructed Military 
Concept for Defence against Terrorism provided 
a basis for NATO deployment in response to 
terrorism and two so-called ‘Article 5’ operations 
were launched, backfilling US AWACS3 capacity 
and patrolling the Mediterranean to limit terrorist 
access to non-conventional weapons.4 
In only a slightly longer time, NATO then 
reviewed and re-evaluated what it did, or could 
do, of relevance to countering terrorism. Its focus 
was initially on ensuring a rapid military response 
(through the NATO Response Force), improved 
intelligence sharing and measures against non-
conventional (CBRN) and explosives attacks, 
but it also reached out to partners, seeking a 
fuller picture of the terrorist threat and others’ 
experience of counter-measures. Subsequently, 
NATO invested in Consequence Management, 
Civil Emergency Planning, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and the development/deployment of 
new technologies against asymmetric attacks.
Thereafter, NATO perched, surrounded by familiar 
issues, many of them previously mainstream 
activities but now labelled ‘CT,’ in a more-or-
less settled fashion for ten years, still without 
a CT policy or a dedicated staff structure. This 
may seem extraordinary in retrospect, given the 
current context, but NATO, like all international 
organisations, only mobilises on a specific topic 
when there is a groundswell of high-level political 
attention, and there were seemingly more pressing 
issues at the time (e.g. in Afghanistan and the 
Balkans).
3 Airborne Warning and Control System
4 Operations Eagle Assist and Active Endeavour
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Nest building
Even the best perch can only ever be temporary 
and for NATO to have a stable long-term approach 
to CT a stronger base better adapted to its 
surroundings was needed. The CT environment 
had indeed changed in those 10 years: United 
Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, 
especially 1263 , had pushed nations to create and 
begin to implement their own CT strategies; the 
EU put one in place in 2005; and in 2006 the UN 
reached agreement on a Global CT Strategy. So, 
it was rather late in the day, in 2010, that NATO 
assigned staff to a CT section and undertook a 
full review of the relevant terrorist threats and 
of its own strengths together with a gap analysis, 
looking for NATO-shaped holes amongst the roles 
of other international organisations. The findings 
were then structured and put forward for allied 
approval.
The outcome was NATO’s CT Policy Guidelines,5 
endorsed by Heads of State and Government at 
the Chicago Summit of 2012. NATO was tasked 
to address three pillars: Awareness of the threat 
(through intelligence exchange, consultations 
etc.), Capabilities (to ensure NATO action 
remained possible despite the terrorist threat) 
and Engagement with partner nations and other 
international organisations (to ensure a cohesive 
international approach). Everything NATO was 
directed to do was to be in support of its allies 
but still many found aspects of a NATO CT role 
uncomfortable, particularly those who viewed CT 
as a strictly domestic challenge. There was little 
desire for a public profile for NATO on CT and no 
dedicated strategic communication approach was 
to be attempted. Likewise, there was no appetite 
to point to any CT value arising from NATO’s 
missions (e.g. Afghanistan, the Balkans and later 
Libya and the Horn of Africa) except (as in the 
case of Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean) if 
the mandate was specifically CT-related. 
5 NATO CT Policy Guidelines http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm 
Faced with these caveats and very varied levels 
of national interest, annual progress reports put 
to the allies together with proposals to increase 
NATO’s level of CT ambition achieved only modest 
increments of progress – until the tweeting started 
and the prime tweeter became a President.
Twittering and crowing
The basic Trump criticism of NATO on CT was 
largely unwarranted. NATO has clear value to add 
to the efforts of nations and other international 
organisations and was already working within 
the CT field with a large community (some 70 
nations) of both partners and allies. As the Wales6 
and Warsaw7 summit declarations make plain, CT 
had been recognised as an aspect of the broader 
NATO flagships of Deterrence and Defence and 
Projecting Stability. Nevertheless, the need for an 
international response to the threat from ISIS/
Da’esh, concerns about radicalisation, home-
grown terrorism, foreign terrorist fighter flows, 
the deterioration of the situation in Iraq etc. 
prompted NATO, and many others, to launch a 
review of what more could be done.
Egg laying
In spring 2017, allied discussions started in 
earnest and, almost 30 committee meetings and 
formal or informal meetings of the North Atlantic 
Council later, a report of NATO’s strong points and 
achievements to date accompanied by a 38-point 
action plan was agreed and presented to Heads of 
State and Government in May for endorsement. 
The clutch of 38 actions are grouped under seven 
pillars: awareness and analysis, preparedness and 
responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building 
and partnerships, operations, governance and 
strategic communications. Many of the tasks are 
6 Wales Summit Declaration http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/
natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en 
7 Warsaw Summit Declaration http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en
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predominantly for internal action but, especially 
for an external audience, the following five 
areas have particular importance and are worth 
highlighting.
1. Recognition of the CT-impact of 
NATO missions and operations whether 
or not the mandate includes a mention 
of terrorism. Contributing to stability, 
capabilities and capacity-building of states 
(e.g. through the Resolute Support Mission 
in Afghanistan, Sea Guardian, assistance to 
Iraq and support for the Global Coalition 
to defeat ISIS) is now appreciated for its 
CT-relevance. NB NATO was welcomed 
as a full member of the Global Coalition 
immediately after the May 2017 meeting.
2. Appreciation of the CT-relevance of 
adaptation already underway at NATO 
as part of the effort to be better aware of 
developments to NATO’s south and better 
positioned and prepared to be able to 
engage e.g. on Libya. The Hub for the South 
based in Naples reached initial capability 
in September 2017 and will contribute 
to enabling CT-relevant support to be 
provided to partners in the region.
3. Commitment to a more systematic 
approach to training, advising and 
assisting partners on CT. This is part of 
a wider NATO approach across a variety 
of topics under the Projecting Stability 
banner, using all relevant assets where 
appropriate e.g. Special Forces, Centres of 
Excellence etc. 
4. A focus on intelligence that does not 
just belabour the ‘share more’ point but has 
practical deliverables. This includes the 
creation of a Terrorism Intelligence Cell, 
the making available of information from 
operational theatres to allies domestically 
and the use of Joint Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets 
where they can be helpful against terrorist 
activity.
5. A firm resolve to be more joined 
up with the overall international effort. 
A strong focus on the EU, but also more 
widely to ensure more engagement 
with the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Global 
CT Forum (GCTF) and INTERPOL, and 
to initiate CT relationships with regional 
organisations such as the African Union, 
Gulf Cooperation Council, G5 Sahel and 
ECOWAS. 
These are combined with a (perhaps overdue) 
realisation that better public awareness of NATO’s 
role could be helpful, as not only the US but other 
allies too are asking for NATO to have a more 
visible role. A communications framework is now 
under development.
Any chicks likely?
The level of ambition captured in the Action Plan 
was not arrived at without a struggle and is as 
challenging as consensus decision-making allows. 
This means that it is daunting to some allies and 
disappoints others. There are still those who would 
rather not use NATO for CT except in extremis, 
preferring to act alone, in ad hoc coalitions or 
through the EU. Some allies are averse to non-
permissive environments, most are economically 
constrained and everyone jostles to see their 
favourite partner nation or organisation benefit 
from new initiatives, so the implementation 
process is bound to be interesting. 
Will NATO be able to take this set of intentions 
through to fully fledged activities? One thing 
is sure: it will not be for want of trying at the 
institutional level. As an indication of high-
level resolve, the Secretary General has already 
appointed his Deputy, Ambassador Rose 
Gottemoeller, as coordinator to drive the effort 
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forward. But only allies are able to ensure that 
the environment will indeed be conducive to 
effective egg-hatching. Will the resource situation 
be comfortable enough? Will the engagement be 
consistent enough? Will the political attention 
span be long enough? Or will bird brain responses 
complicate matters?
Counting chickens
NATO’s review cycles for CT are becoming shorter: 
the first took a decade to come round, the second 
only half that, and the next is likely to follow in 
two to three years’ time. What there will be to 
commend next time round will, as has been said, 
depend on national engagement, resourcing and 
persistence. Whilst the future can never be certain, 
NATO should at least be recognised in 2017 for 
an effective overhaul and relaunch of its CT effort 
that is coherent with the overall international 
approach. It has not succumbed to the temptation 
to divert its efforts into areas better addressed by 
others. Counter- and de- radicalisation are not 
NATO’s strengths and the financing of terrorism, 
social media counter-messaging and improved law 
enforcement are definitely best left to others. But 
what NATO has in the way of unique assets, at the 
military end of the spectrum, it has committed to 
use wisely and as part of the greater whole. Against 
terrorism, as with many security challenges, the 
universal aspiration should be to ensure that 
national, international, internal, external, civilian 
and military aspects of prevention and response 
are seamlessly joined – a far from trivial task but 
one in which NATO, the EU and others can have 
an important influence.




ALTERNATIVE TO A 
EUROPEAN FBI?
Wil van Gemert 
Deputy Executive Director of Europol and 
responsible for the Operations Department.
Introduction
At the age of 18 it is generally assumed one reaches 
the status of adulthood. It is often the case that 
one’s physical appearance and self-consciousness 
change significantly in the years prior to this. 
Whether this also applies to organizations is 
probably questionable. However, the fact is 
that Europol just recently turned 18 years old 
and during the last three years a big change in 
positioning and role for the organization has taken 
place. This article covers developments as they 
unfolded in the area of European law enforcement 
and the way in which they have impacted the role 
and positioning of Europol and instigated change. 
Europol as an organization: 
the crown jewels
Europol, or more specifically the European Police 
Office, as the organization has formally been 
called since 1 May 2017, is the agency of the 
EU which aims to improve and support police 
cooperation in Europe, thereby increasing the 
safety of its citizens. The agency is housed in a 
modern and state of the art building in The Hague, 
where, currently, already more than 1000 people 
work. Europol focusses mainly on cross-border 
organized crime, terrorism and cybercrime. At 
the time of the creation of the European Union 
and the opening of borders, it was a logical 
consequence to simultaneously strengthen police 
cooperation through better data exchange. The 
Schengen Information System (SIS) can be seen 
as another tool to support this cooperation. Both 
are responses to reduced border controls and 
responsibilities of the individual countries.
In order to perform this task properly, Europol has 
a number of resources. The most important ones, 
and those which could be considered her current 
crown jewels, will be briefly outlined below.
The largest liaison community in one building in 
the world: One of the most important principles at 
Europol’s creation was that in addition to creating 
an agency there would also be representation of 
the Member States on site. This principle of ‘desks’ 
to represent the Member States has grown into 
a community of more than 200 liaison officers 
from 43 countries. These include not only the 
28 Member States but also other important 
partners with which Europol has predominantly 
operational cooperation agreements. These are 
countries like the US, Canada, Australia and 
Columbia, and also Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, 
Serbia, Albania, etc. These liaison officers are 
formally not part of Europol but are employed 
by their own governments and supported and 
housed within the Europol building. This is a 
unique facility which, for example, allows police 
officers confronted with unknown factors in an 
international case to ask questions in their own 
language and have the questions communicated 
in English to the dedicated representative of the 
other country. With the knowledge of the national 
organisations in the countries at hand, there is 
assurance that the questions will subsequently 
be addressed to the right person. The potential of 
this instrument is huge, not only when it comes 
to individual questions but also for the exchange 
of information in the case of an emergency or 
when a large-scale incident or attack occurs. 
Representatives of all the countries can be brought 
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together in an operations room within 15 minutes. 
As an illustration of the recognition of the value 
of this ‘place to be,’ the US is now represented at 
Europol by 11 agencies and 18 permanent and 7 
temporary liaison officers.
Its databases: Since its inception, Europol 
has been exchanging and storing information 
about suspects and crimes. Member States and 
operational partners can ‘subscribe’ to the various 
analytical projects and in doing so commit 
themselves to recording data on the projects. 
These databases currently include almost 30 
different crime areas, ranging from all forms of 
drug crime, firearms, trafficking in human beings, 
terrorism and extremism, and the various forms of 
cybercrime, including fraud and sports corruption. 
Very soon an analytical project in the field of war 
crimes will be launched. The information is stored 
under a strict data protection regime, is regularly 
evaluated, and has since expanded to more than 
28 million items. This is an important source 
allowing Europol to make connections between 
ongoing investigations. Approximately 5,000 
analytical reports are produced annually, in either 
extensive or limited format, and they are sent to 
the stakeholders by Europol.
The secure connection system – SIENA: 
Currently with more than 7000 users and 700 
connected national units, competent authorities 
and organizations, a system is needed to allow 
the secure exchange and communication of 
information. The Secure Information Exchange 
Network Application (SIENA) is a secure and 
efficient connecting system through which 
approximately 20,000 messages are exchanged on 
a weekly basis. This may be bilateral data exchange 
but it may also entail informing all Member States 
about concrete cases, changes in modus operandi, 
or important information about incidents. Europol 
receives approximately 2,000 weekly messages, 
which, after verifying that the information falls 
within the mandate, are accepted and processed.
The expertise role: Focussing on nearly 30 
different organized crime areas and having the 
ability to recruit operational staff from 28 Member 
States, Europol must be in a position to be able 
to acquire the latest expertise and knowledge 
in these fields. The majority of the staff in the 
Operations Directorate are either specialists or 
analysts. More than 120 analysts are involved in 
analysing the information in the various analytical 
projects. The specialists are expected to have 
background knowledge in the different task areas 
and to be able to produce ‘early warning’ reports 
on changing modus operandi. The latest expertise 
is also available in areas of forensic engineering, 
social media and strategic analysis. 
The Coordination Task: With an overview of 
more than 1,000 ‘high profile’ investigations and 
assisted by the aforementioned means, there is 
the possibility of coordinating and de-conflicting 
between the various investigations. Also in the 
field of EMPACT (European multidisciplinary 
platform against criminal threats) priorities, the 
primary criminal areas chosen by the European 
Union, Europol plays a role by coordinating 
investigations and the activities to be launched. For 
this purpose, it is possible to create an operational 
coordination centre within a few hours or to use, 
for example, the three equipped operations rooms. 
Actions like Archimedes and Ciconia Alba are 
some good examples. The recent takedown of the 
two biggest dark markets, Alpha Bay and Hansa, 
are examples of better results being achieved 
through international coordination. 
The development of these ‘crown jewels’ and, at the 
same time, the situation in Europe since 2015 in 
which migration and terrorism have increasingly 
determined the agenda have led to Europol 
developing a different position and role in the 
field of investigation. One of the most important 
‘game changers’ is the rise of cybercrime. This is 
an area where international cooperation is always 
necessary but at the same time where Member 
States do not always have the necessary knowledge. 
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EC3, the Cyber Centre established 5 years ago, can 
be seen as a forerunner in this area and it steered 
Europol onto a new course. Currently, many new 
developments and initiatives are rooted in the 
cyber environment and are then applied in other 
areas.
Europol’s changing roles
With regard to Europol’s new positioning, in my 
view three important roles can be distinguished:
1. Europol from information 
warehouse to supporter in the 
complete investigation cycle
Whereas in the first instance Europol’s task was 
primarily seen as providing for information 
exchange and the setup of relevant databases, this 
role has changed over the last few years. Partly due 
to the possibility of having operational meetings 
financed, Europol is now also involved at the start 
of investigations, during progress discussions 
and in the operational end-phase. Europol 
remains involved even after an investigation has 
been completed. This support includes not only 
being on the spot with a mobile office to directly 
check information but also supporting data 
retrieval, giving forensic support and providing 
expertise in, e.g., drugs lab dismantling, analysing 
confiscated data and making reports, which 
can also be used immediately in court. Another 
important application is the handling of seized 
material in an internationally coordinated action. 
The best example of this is probably the Victim 
Identification Task Force. This is an annual action 
where in one joint effort and over a period of 14 
days information that is not linked to national 
targets related to child pornography networks is 
analysed. More than 20 countries were involved 
in the last action in 2017. In the space of two 
weeks, 40 detectives analysed the information 
they had brought with them using the Europol 
forensic network. These actions have already led 
to the identification of more than 40 children who, 
without any doubt, would otherwise not have 
been identified and taken away from the situation 
of abuse. In addition, after the attacks in Paris 
and Brussels, the way in which a Europol task 
force called Fraternite delivered direct operational 
support for 1.5 years and was part of the Joint 
Investigation Team (JIT) illustrates a role newly 
required of Europol, one which Europol offered. 
2. Europol as an alternative to 
an EU investigative body, or the 
need for European policing;
In recent years, the call for a European style FBI 
has been heard several times. This has mainly 
had to do with the need of, e.g., the European 
Parliament or other authorities to have priorities 
better defined as an answer to, in their view, failing 
investigations. As a professional, I do not think 
this is the solution. However, there is a need to 
do things in a uniform European way or to gain 
insights at the European level. This became most 
clear to Europol when in 2015/2016 the asylum 
flow within Europe manifested itself. Frontex had 
a clear view of the number of incoming migrants 
at the borders, but not within the EU. As a 
consequence, at the request of the Member States, 
Europol drafted a daily monitoring report to reflect 
developments within the EU and thereby support 
police activity. The same need exists with respect 
to, e.g., standards in the field of e-evidence and the 
analysis techniques used. Future initiatives such 
as ETIAS and PNR also highlight the need for a 
European centre in which tools such as a watch list 
are set up. A centre for enhanced cooperation and 
standardization together with a ‘one-way stop’ for 
private partners or other institutions where EU-
wide interests in the area of law enforcement are 
concerned is required. In my view, Europol can 
and should fulfil this role.
THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPOL: AN ALTERNATIVE TO A EUROPEAN FBI? - Wil van Gemert39
3. From collecting towards more 
connecting
As a data processing agency, Europol is very active 
in the business of ‘collecting’ information. In recent 
years, we have seen a huge increase in this area. 
For example, the amount of information shared 
by Member States and third states on foreign 
fighters has grown tenfold in the last 2 years. In 
other areas too, we see an increase in the quantity 
of information received with quarterly growth 
between 20% and 25%. This trend has certainly 
been continuing for the last 2.5 years. In addition, 
the number of messages sent via SIENA will be over 
1 million this year. In 2014, it was only 605,245. A 
similar increase can be seen in consultations of EIS, 
the Europol Information System. Although this 
development is very encouraging, it appears that, 
in addition to gathering information, connecting 
the various databases available is becoming more 
and more important. It is not surprising that a 
High Level Interoperability Working Group was 
set up at the European level last year. The aim of 
this group is to explore how existing systems such 
as SIS II, VIS and PRUM can be better aligned and 
used. Furthermore, the amount of data available 
has increased exponentially. It is therefore a 
question of better use of data already available in 
other systems, like, for example, at the FIUs. It is 
an illusion to think that all this data should still 
be stored in one big central data system. We also 
notice a similar trend in mainstream industry to 
focus more on connecting, real-time access and 
cloud applications. This means that Europol is 
increasingly profiling as a connector and supporter 
of information. A good example is its acquisition 
of the FIU support unit and its maintenance of the 
FIU network. Recent attacks have shown that the 
main problem is a fragmentation of information 
rather than a lack of availability of information on 
criminal suspects. 
In my view, these three developments characterise 
the changing position of Europol. I am convinced 
that developments will continue, partly through 
new initiatives that are being undertaken and 
partly owing to changes in society and their impact 
on the fight against organized crime.
Other cooperation in the 
area of terrorism
The developments outlined were intensified by the 
attacks in 2015. On the evening of 13 November 
2015, directly following the attack, an Incident 
Response Team was set up at Europol and in the 
following weeks its staff grew to 60 members. At 
the request of France, operational on-the-spot 
support was immediately provided, together 
with analysis of the information available. In the 
course of the following months, more than 19 
terabytes of information from France and Belgium 
was submitted to Europol. The focus was put on 
identification of the support network, travel 
movements and the international dimension. 
Simply stated, whilst the national research teams 
focussed more on who did what and where, 
Europol concentrated more on why, how and what 
will follow. Europol is still working on these cases 
and already more than 120 analysis reports have 
been drafted.
The same approach and support was repeated 
in subsequent investigations, amongst others 
in Brussels, Copenhagen and Berlin, thereby 
creating a support platform for the establishment 
of the European Counter Terrorism Centre 
(ECTC). By, amongst other things, applying 
methods that have already proven to be successful 
in tackling cybercrime, such as joint liaison teams 
of operational staff, the collating of operational 
information, the extension of several databases 
and a strong focus on social media and financial 
information, ECTC has in a short period of time 
established itself as an important support and 
facilitation centre. The databases that have now 
been created are an important source for all 
current and future investigations into terrorism. 
Furthermore, by collaborating with partners 
such as Interpol and non-EU countries, the 
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amount of information has grown exponentially. 
As such, ECTC provides an important base for 
strengthening future operational cooperation in 
Europe in the area of combatting terrorism.
The Future
I would like to conclude by providing some 
examples of similar developments. The need 
to face European threats at the European 
level requires enhanced cooperation and the 
prevention of duplication. Existing partnerships 
such as ATLAS (the agency in which the SWAT 
teams work together in Europe) are looking for a 
partner to join so they can use its infrastructure 
and support possibilities while keeping their 
own identity. Greater cooperation between 
European intelligence services, in a premature 
form of a fusion cell, will also lead to some type of 
cooperation with their counterpart in the area of 
investigation, i.e. Europol. 
The development of society to one in which 
citizens are becoming more and more global 
means that for the management of contacts, 
connections, overstays and financial flows they 
make use of infrastructure which is no longer 
owned or accessed by national authorities. Where 
in the past the national telecom company or hotel 
reservations could be accessed through national 
systems and national legal orders, Google, 
Bitcoins, Facebook, Whatsapp and Air BNB now 
represent substantial problems for investigative 
authorities. How to retrieve information from 
these companies is relatively unknown and 
complicated. Conversely, these companies need 
a supra-national approach instead of making 
arrangements with each and every single 
government. Here too there will be an increasing 
need to act more through an organization such as 
Europol. A first experience of this already exists 
at the level of the Internet Referral Unit, which is 
part of Europol, and partly plays an overarching 
role in this area. New initiatives are also being 
born, like the development of Sirius, a tool that 
should provide a solution exactly in this area.
In short, Europol acts in a very dynamic 
environment. Whether it should exist is no 
longer in question. It is now all about defining the 
boundaries and the right demarcation. This makes 
the role and developments of Europol only more 
interesting.
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